John Donvan
This is Open To Debate, I’m John Donvan. Hi everybody. There was a time when the United States was the only nuclear power on Earth, but that was a short-lived period of time. The Russians got one four years after the United States and eventually several more states elbowed their way into the so-called nuclear club. There was France, there was Britain, China, Israel, South Africa, India, Pakistan, North Korea. And what has turned out to be true, especially in regard to the nations we tend to have stressed relations with, North Korea, is that once these nations go nuclear we just have to live with the fact. We can’t make them un-nuclear.

Being nuclear is its own protection. The nation that is not quite there yet, but appears to be accelerating toward the nuclear club is Iran. According to US Secretary of State Tony Blinken, speaking in 2024, Iran at present could put together a testable nuclear weapon in a matter of a week or two.

Audio
Where we are now is not in a good place. Uh, Iran because, uh, the nuclear agreement was, uh, thrown out, instead of being, um, at least a year away from having the breakout capacity producing fissile material for a nuclear weapon, is now probably one or two weeks away from doing that. Now, they haven’t developed a weapon itself-

Just one or two weeks? That’s what [inaudible

:18]-
[NEW_PARAGRAPH]One or two weeks is probably what the realistic breakout time is. They haven’t produced a weapon itself, but that’s something, of course, that we track very, very carefully. And you put those two things together, the fissile material, an explosive device, and you have a nuclear weapon.

John Donvan
After which the rest of the world would just have to live with it. A military and political reality. But if there’s a way to stop Iran from reaching that point, by the use of force, should force be considered or at least the threat of force? And if not, what other options are there for stopping Iran that really have a chance of working? That’s what we’re gonna be examining in this episode where the question we’re asking is, it’s an either/or question, can America and its allies tolerate a nuclear Iran or is it time to stop them now? So let’s meet our debaters. First I wanna welcome Barbara Slavin, distinguished fellow at the Stimson Center. Barbara, welcome to Open To Debate. I understand, uh, Stimson Center give all of your staff, all, uh, all of you on staff an assignment to write a memo to the president, incoming President Trump. What was your assignment? What did you write?

Barbara Slavin
I wrote about how to prevent a nuclear crisis with Iran. So this is a very well-timed event. And I look forward to dis- uh, discussing some of my recommendations.

John Donvan
Means you’ve been thinking about this for quite a while?

Barbara Slavin
For many years. Yeah.

John Donvan
Okay. I wanna welcome also on the opposing side, Behnam Ben Taleblu. He’s a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. Behnam, welcome. Uh, you also have been doing some writing on the topic. What… Do you have a title to share with us?

Behnam Ben Taleblu
Uh, yes. Actually in August of this year I and a couple of colleagues wrote a memo called Deterring Iran’s Dash to the Bomb, looking at precisely this issue. Particularly focusing on the few times the regime has walked back some of it’s past national security goals and the role of military force.

John Donvan
All right. You both have been thinking about this a lot. So we really appreciate having you both here. And I wanna move right away to our opening statements, we want each of you to take a few minutes to explain why you’re taking the position you are. Again, our topic is an either/or question, can America and its allies tolerate a nuclear Iran? Or is it time to stop them now? Barbara, you are taking the tolerate position, please tell us why.

Barbara Slavin
I am indeed. Uh, I think we should begin by saying that no one wants to see a country like Iran get nuclear weapons. But if the choice is between Iran with a bomb and bombing Iran, I would say that Iran with a bomb is more tolerable. Uh, why? I, I think there’re many reasons, uh, first and foremost, diplomacy is almost always a better option. Uh, and it’s particularly so in the case of Iran. We have to remember that in 2015 Iran agreed to quite radically, uh, restrict it’s nuclear program, uh, in return for sanctions relief. This was something called the, uh, Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, JCPOA. And Iran kept it’s, it’s part of the bargain. Uh, unfortunately the Trump administration, which came in after the Obama administration left office, did not keep the US part of the bargain, it withdrew unilaterally from the deal in 2018. Iran waited a year, uh, afterwards to, uh, to see whether Europeans would continue to trade with them. When that didn’t happen they started to accelerate their program.

So Iran in 2025 is in a very different place. Uh, it has a much more advanced nuclear program, uh, with scary amounts of highly enriched uranium. I’m not sure they could make a bomb in two weeks, but they could certainly have fissile material for several bombs in, in two weeks. Um, but at the same time Iran has, uh, experienced a number of setbacks, particularly in its regional security posture. And it has a lot of domestic challenges. So I think because of that we’re actually in a better place now to negotiate a, a new agreement. Um, we also have in Iran an administration that I think is super motivated to have new talks. Um, so diplomacy is preferable, it’s always preferable because military action can have unpredictable consequences. There will inevi- inevitably be casualties from military strikes, uh, maybe a dangerous leak of radiation that sickens or kills thousands. Uh, any attack, absent proof that Iran has actually begun to weaponize, would violate international law, remember what that is? Uh, and it would also spark Iranian retaliation, for sure.

Uh, indeed Iran has said quite clearly that if it’s attacked in a massive way it would leave the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, it would kick out remaining inspectors, uh, and it would rush for a bomb. So we could get the result we don’t want, uh, by bombing Iran. Uh, there’s also the fact that while Israel, especially with US help, could cause significant damage to the Iranian nuclear program, it can’t destroy it. This is not like, uh, Israel attacking the Osirak reactor in Iraq in 1981 or a Syrian reactor in 2007, this is not one and done. Iran has had a nuclear program since the ’50s. You can’t bomb the knowledge out of the heads of Iranian nuclear scientists. Uh, so by bombing them we, we incentivize them. In fact, I’m thinking when Israel bombed the Osirak reactor in 1981 it incentivized Saddam Hussein to go for nuclear weapons. He just tried different ways of doing it.

So, um, you mentioned the memos to the president. Uh, at Stimson we were all encouraged last year to write, uh, so-called memos to the president. And in my memo, How to Avoid a Nuclear Crisis with Iran, I made some policy recommendations. So, uh, I welcome folks to go to the Stimson website and read the article in full. But just to quickly summarize. Uh, first, this is something Trump folks are already doing, uh, use the threat of tighter enforcement of economic sanctions as leverage to get Iran back into talks. Uh, and realistic talks. Second, encourage more transparency by Iran with the International Atomic Energy Agency, more monitoring. Third, host official direct talks. They can be in Oman, Qatar, Vienna, uh, G- Geneva or New York.

John Donvan
Barbara, I have to stop you at third. And you can… because you’ve hit time and you can bring up your other points-

Barbara Slavin
Ah, one last one, if I can just squeeze it in. A Trump Plan of Action, this would be, uh, a realistic schedule of monitoring nuclear rollbacks and sanctions relief. Suggest Trump could win a Nobel Prize for achieving a TPOA and that this could be his Nixon to China moment.

John Donvan
Thanks very much, Barbara. Um, Behnam, it’s now your turn. Again, this topic, can American and its allies tolerate a nuclear Iran or is it time to stop Iran now? You are taking “stop Iran now” as your argument. Your chance to tell us why.

Behnam Ben Taleblu
Thank you very much. Uh, the idea that America and it’s allies cannot and should tolerate… should not tolerate a nuclear-armed Islamic Republic of Iran is not new, it’s not particularly novel. And in fact, it’s quite vanilla. Every single US president, Democrat or Republican, isolationist or internationalist who has come to the fore after 2002, when Iran’s nuclear facilities were, uh, previously covert and then unveiled, has had prevention, not containment and deterrence, as their centerpiece of the Iran policy. I’m arguing that, that it is the right approach to continue to take because of the disastrous consequences of letting the world’s foremost state sponsor of terrorism get access to the world’s most dangerous weapons.

First, let’s zoom out a little bit. Naturally, uh, a collapse in a US security position on this scale over two or three decades where bipartisan efforts were made to try to prevent the Islamic Republic would have significant follow-on effects for actors in the region, such as Saudi Arabia or Türkiye, to begin to doubt US security guarantees, to encourage hedging in a very dangerous part of the world. And as we all know that which happens the Middle East is never limited to the Middle East. Major US geopolitical competitors like Russia or China may be incentivized to take advantage of the dip in the American position and the irresolution seen therein and press other crises at the same time, making it a disastrous kinda geopolitical conflagration. Uh, beyond the proliferation cascade is that Tehran’s theocrats, flush from the idea of having just bested an entity that they call The Great Satan, are going to engage in significantly more risk taking. That is fundamentally the problem. All of the issues that we have with the Islamic Republic today, missiles, drones, terrorism, cyber, foreign aggression, domestic suppression, maritime harassment, all of them would be quite literally put on steroids because the Islamic Republic it’s territory would be immune and that it would have a shield of nuclear immunity to prosecute it’s export revolution, something we’ve seen violently throughout the Middle East for the past four decades.

Most acutely, we have to remember that in the first decade of the Islamic Republic’s existence, and this stuff is documented, Tehran used chemical weapons, admittedly in response to Saddam Hussein’s massive use of chemical weapons against it during the Iran-Iraq War. And Tehran transferred chemical weapons, another form of WMD, to the Gaddafi re- regime in Libya. So the debate over Iran’s willingness to use WMD and transfer WMD is already lost, that is already out of the bag. Second, the regime’s willingness to engage in proliferation of destabilizing systems to multiple parts of the world make it an arsonist in many of the world’s fires. With respect to Russia, close range ballistic missiles and suicide drones. With respect to Hezbollah, which is now decimated thanks to Israel, precision-guided munitions. And most acutely now, s- five or six times since Christmas the Houthis in Yemen, the rebels support… the rebels that the Islamic Republic supports are using nuclear capable medium range ballistic missiles, technology that most states don’t even have to try to strike at Israel, the only Jewish and democratic state in the Middle East.

More acutely, in 2024, not once, not twice, but thrice the Islamic Republic overtly, directly, and kinetically used chemical weapon… used ballistic missiles, I’m sorry, launched from its own territory, at the target of a nuclear-armed state. So take everything we know about nuclear deterrence and throw that out the window because that was insufficient to prevent Tehran’s theocrats from striking Pakistan in January, striking Israel in April, and striking Israel again in October of 2024. Just roll back a little bit further in 2023, this is a regime that even without a nuclear umbrella was willing to underwrite the capabilities that Hamas amassed that launched the October 7 gru- brutal and gruesome terrorist attack against Israel in the region. Oh, unless we forget on the nuclear front, the regime has pushed past multiple nuclear red lines. And in February of 2023 enriched to 83% purity. Uh, this is a hop, skip, and a jump away from 90%, which is what is needed for a nuclear weapon.

The Islamic Republic or Iran cannot be permitted to access the world’s most dangerous weapons, not only would this be a strategic shortcoming, this would be a massive political shortcoming for any administration in US. And that’s why prevention has to remain the policy.

John Donvan
Thank you very much. And now it’s time to take a quick break. And when we come back we’re gonna look further into our either/or question, can America and its allies tolerate a nuclear Iran or is it time to stop them now? I’m John Donvan, this is Open To Debate.

Welcome back to Open To Debate where we’re taking on the question, can America and its allies tolerate a nuclear Iran or is it time to stop them now? I’m John Donvan and I’m joined by our debaters, Barbara Slavin and Behnam Ben Taleblu. And in your opening statements you, you gave us some interesting things already to think about. Barbara, you made the case in arguing that we can tolerate a nuclear Iran. Let’s be clear, you do not want a nuclear Iran, but you’re saying that the way forward is through diplomacy. You’re making the argument that it’s worked before, you’re further making the argument that the Iranians are now more ripe for negotiation because they are weakened, as a result of, uh, events in 2023. Um, and you’re feeling that they’re actually motivated for a negotiation. You further make the case that military action, use of force, would have very negative consequences. Not just for the Iranians, but for a larger group of people through civilian casualties, through, um, spread of radiation. And finally you make the case that their, their effort really cannot be stopped through military action. That is too entrenched. So that’s, that’s the case you’re making.

Uh, Behnam, you’re making the argument that given everything about Iran, they just cannot be allowed to have this weapon, that this would embolden them in ways that would be incredibly dangerous for the region. We already seen them willing to and participating in destabilizing activity around the region. And if they had nuclear weapons they would be able to take that many, many steps further. As to whether they would actually be willing to take the risk of using a nuclear bomb or sharing it with other people, you make the case, “Well, they did it with chemical weapons,” that was a weapon of mass destruction, that was supposed to be off the table. They put it on the table in response initially to Iraq. And again, repeatedly that they would use a nuke if they had the opportunity and we have to take that seriously. So that’s what I hear both of you saying.

I wanna bring in the, the example of what we mean by tolerate and what the implications of that would be. Barbara, we tolerate another country that we consider destabilizing, North Korea. What does tolerating North Korea mean?

Barbara Slavin
Yeah. Well, I look at the North Korea example in a, a slightly different way. We had an agreement with the North Koreans, called the Agreed Framework. George W Bush pulled out of that deal, there were some indications that the North Koreans were experimenting with uranium enrichment, um, uh, which they had not declared to anyone. But, uh, George W Bush, uh, stopped providing fuel oil to the North Koreans, as a result they pulled out of the Agreed Framework, quit the NPT, kicked out inspectors, and developed nuclear weapons. This was something we feared frankly when Trump withdrew from the JCPOA in, in 2018. And I’m very afraid that this is a scenario we could see, uh, uh, happening this year if there’s not another diplomatic agreement. So even the North Koreans were willing to abide by most of the provisions of a diplomatic agreement. Tolerate…

Uh, North Korea, again, it’s hard to compare with Iran in, in this sense that it’s a small, isolated country far from, uh, major US interests. Uh, uh-

John Donvan
Okay. Lemme-

Barbara Slavin
… I don’t see them as, as a threat. Iran I think would be a bigger threat for-

John Donvan
All right.

Barbara Slavin
… some of the reasons that Behnam mentioned.

Behnam Ben Taleblu
Well, qualitatively, the one area were we concur is that North Korea is not like the Islamic Republic, although it does have a global force projection. North Korea is the entity that actually helped get Iran it’s first medium range nuclear capable ballistic missile. Uh, it is a threat to US allies, literal legal allies and treaty partners, uh, in Northeast Asia, like Japan and like, uh, South Korea for that, for that example. Uh, but ultimately North Korea doesn’t have the range and the reach of the Islamic Republic’s transnational terrorist apparatus. Quite literally operating on four con- continents. Iranian drones today can be found on four continents. So the US has, unfortunately, tolerated a nuclear-armed North Korea. But another reason for that is the conventional buildup that North Korea has had, basically conventionally, not using nuclear weapons. North Korea can go after Seoul, the South Korean capital. Unfortunately Washington and it’s allies diddled, with immense respect, while the Islamic Republic built up a similar conventional capability in the Middle East. Now, fortunately thanks to the Israelis that conventional capability has been rolled back, the gutting of Hezbollah in the north with Lebanon. Uh, the gutting of Hamas in the south with Gaza. And then the fall of the Assad regime right in the heart of the Middle East.

Uh, so they’re not necessarily the same, they’re apples and oranges. And just because we had one mistake that was a geopolitical disaster-

John Donvan
Okay.

Behnam Ben Taleblu
… doesn’t [inaudible

:42] the other.

Barbara Slavin
Well, we made the same mistake, which was pulling out of agreements that had been reached-

Behnam Ben Taleblu
Well, we also-

Barbara Slavin
… that, that constrained the nuclear programs both these countries.

Behnam Ben Taleblu
But we also forgot about one thing, which is one reason that the North Koreans, after the US left the Agreed Framework and after they made good on their threats, could sprint to a bomb was that they were cheating the whole time. And we have to remember that.

Barbara Slavin
You know, they were abiding by most of the agreement, we pulled out and we got a worse result. That’s all.

Behnam Ben Taleblu
The Agreed Framework is not like the JCPOA.

Barbara Slavin
No, it was much less detailed.

Behnam Ben Taleblu
Yeah.

John Donvan
Let’s talk about the word “now” in our question. You’re saying it’s time to stop them now?

Behnam Ben Taleblu
Yeah.

John Donvan
Now we have a new president coming in the United States, a new administration taking over. And now also it points to a time when Iran is certainly more vulnerable than it’s been in some time. And Barbara’s making the case that that vulnerability opens the door to the opportunity for diplomacy. Do you see that vulnerability serving that purpose as well?

Behnam Ben Taleblu
That vulnerability certain has an impact and I certainly think Washington, Jerusalem, the West should capitalize on that vulnerability. But that vulnerability would not be enshrined and I would argue should not be enshrined in another time-limited nuclear deal where the West trades again major economic concessions to get a slight delay in Iran’s nuclear program. The only kind of agreements, and this is a major if, that I would even support at this time is a major dismantlement kind of agreement. So among the countries that you mentioned in the intro today, South Africa would be a good example or historically Taiwan would be a good example.

Barbara Slavin
But what would you be willing to trade? Would you be willing to promise full sanctions relief in return?

Behnam Ben Taleblu
I think the only instance under which… statutory.

Barbara Slavin
Mm-hmm.

Behnam Ben Taleblu
You can remove some of those sanctions rather than waive them, is to meet the conditions about ending the ballistic missile program, ending the WMD program. And if the Islamic Republic is unwilling to end them, then we should [inaudible

:16]-

Barbara Slavin
So you want them to have absolutely no defenses whatsoever?

Behnam Ben Taleblu
This is actually not an argument about defenses, the issue is not Iranian power, that’s a slight morphing of the question, the issue has always been with Iran to what ends is Iranian power wielded? And the fact that the Islamic Republic cast itself literally from the get-go in 1979 as an anti-status quo actor, is what has amassed all of this enmity against it. Military force and the credible threat of military force and tough economic sanctions, not threatened, but vigorously enforced and escalated over time, married with real Israeli rollback of the Axis of Resistance in the region, can get Khamenei, Khomeini’s successor, to drink from the poisoned chalice.

John Donvan
And giving, giving anything in return for their backing away, other than, “We’re not gonna hit you hard”?

Behnam Ben Taleblu
They merely get to survive. You don’t get to pick how a peace agreement is coordinated after you have commenced a whole series of fights and fires in the Middle East.

John Donvan
Okay. So-

Behnam Ben Taleblu
The losers don’t get to set the table for the winners.

John Donvan
The quid pro quo, your opponent is saying, is they get to survive if they step back.

Barbara Slavin
(laughs) I think the Islamic Republic of Iran will probably survive, just not, not very well. No, you have to promise them credible sanctions relief that has some lasting power, uh, that won’t, uh, change… If they abide by the terms of a deal, that won’t change with every US administration. And I think we… There, there’re a number of concessions that are very easy to make. Iran has something like $100 billion in its own oil revenues that are frozen in foreign banks. You can begin to unfreeze some of that money, let them use it for food, medicine, medical devices, which are not supposed to be sanctioned. In return for increasing transparency with the IAEA, rolling back the program, down-blending the highly enriched uranium. A number of steps taken over a timeframe. And it doesn’t have to be a short timeframe. I mean, the previous deal was 15 years. It was cut short by Trump.

Behnam Ben Taleblu
[inaudible

:06] major nuclear considerations were 8 to 10 years, that’s why the snapback [inaudible

:09].

Barbara Slavin
So it can be, it can be a decade long, by then most likely Ayatollah, uh, Khamenei won’t be there anymore. We may see a, a rather different Iran.

Behnam Ben Taleblu
May, may I ask you-

Barbara Slavin
And, and can I say that, you know, some of my other recommendations had to do with their regional posture, with them, uh, not rearming Hezbollah and Hamas. Uh, with them, uh, focusing on the needs of their own people for a change, which has certainly been the demand of the Iranian people.

Behnam Ben Taleblu
Unfortunately it’s one I think that is gonna be ignored again, so long as the leadership is in, is in power-

Barbara Slavin
I’m not so sure. I’m not so sure.

Behnam Ben Taleblu
… in Tehran today. Uh, uh-

Barbara Slavin
Yeah. I’m not so sure. I think that the… that even-

Behnam Ben Taleblu
But do you believe that the Islamic Republic would actually-

Barbara Slavin
… the Iranian regime understands it has to change.

Behnam Ben Taleblu
… trust the West to deliver sanctions relief? Khamenei routinely says that the West cannot be trusted. Uh, he believes that the West walked away from the deal, you’ve mentioned that several times.

Barbara Slavin
I think he might trust Trump, in a way perhaps-

Behnam Ben Taleblu
Khamenei might trust Trump, even though Trump-

Barbara Slavin
In a way-

Behnam Ben Taleblu
… killed Soleimani?

Barbara Slavin
Yeah. Yeah.

Behnam Ben Taleblu
Trump broke the taboo of standing with the Iranian people.

John Donvan
I wanna hear why you feel the Iranians might trust Trump, more than [inaudible

:02].

Barbara Slavin
Because they had… they’ve had this experience with Democrats that the Democrats, uh, ease tensions, happened under Clinton too, eased tensions with Iran, then Republicans come in and everything becomes worse. So why not make a deal with the devil? Make a deal with Trump. That has perhaps a, a greater chance. I mean, I was in some, uh, track one and a half… they call them talks, last spring, uh, with Iranians and they were already not just anticipating a Trump victory, but actually preferring a Trump victory, thinking that they might be able to reach a more durable deal. That Trump could get this through Congress, whereas Democrats would have trouble. And that the Democrats wouldn’t object because they don’t want a war with Iran. So I thought it was an interesting [inaudible

:44].

John Donvan
Thoughts on that insight?

Behnam Ben Taleblu
So there are some traces of this, if you go back to 2019. Iran’s former foreign minister, who is now a vice president, talked about four Bs preventing diplomacy with Iran. Or really in reality preventing a North Korea style moment between Trump and Iran. And he said those four Bs are Bolton, Bibi, bin Salman, bin Zayed. Uh, you know, the, the foreign minister then wasn’t given the runway. Now the regime is actually expanding its diplomatic runway, but I think all eyes need to be on not letting the regime tempt Trump with these kinds of talks and instead holding firm and sticking to the policy of prevention. Because the regime, again, is looking to rope-a-dope Trump, looking to make the president forget that this regime quite literally just tried to kill him. And that would be a major own-goal for the president to engage in direct diplomatic talks with the regime that quite literally tried to kill him on US soil.

John Donvan
Behnam, another argument your opponent made against the use of force is that the use of force cannot actually destroy what they’re doing in Iran. It’s too far underground, it’s too spread out, and the knowledge is gonna stay in people’s heads to do it, to start over again. [inaudible

:45].

Behnam Ben Taleblu
And indeed, there, there is a new facility being built called Pickaxe Mountain that is even deeper than the Fordow facility. But-

John Donvan
So does that mean she’s right?

Behnam Ben Taleblu
No, because there’s always a bigger bomb.

Barbara Slavin
(laughs)

Behnam Ben Taleblu
One thing you need to (laughs)… uh, every single American adversary has to know is that there is always a bigger bomb and they should never doubt the resolve-

Barbara Slavin
Yeah. But-

Behnam Ben Taleblu
… of the US to use force to secure it’s interests.

Barbara Slavin
… what if Iran has already taken advantage of the reduction in monitoring by the IAEA to squirrel away some advanced centrifuges somewhere we have no idea where they are?

Behnam Ben Taleblu
Does that mean we’re already throwing our hands up? If, if, if, if that is the reality that you mentioned-

Barbara Slavin
No, it just means that if we… They have an insurance policy, I’m sure. If we bomb their known facilities, I would bet that they would have covert facilities.

Behnam Ben Taleblu
Does this insurance policy mean that they get to dangle a nuclear sword of Damocles over us and that we have to circumscribe as the great power our relationship vis-à-vis them?

Barbara Slavin
No, it doesn’t mean that. It just means that we have a basis for negotiations, not for bombing them.

John Donvan
Can we step back for just a moment and… for, for people don’t follow this topic really closely, just the fundamental concept, what’s in it for Iran to have a nuclear weapon? Because I wanna understand what they would be giving away if they step back from it.

Behnam Ben Taleblu
So this is a combination of status and security. The Islamic Republic first rejected the late Shah’s nuclear program, the former king of Iran’s nuclear program that they inherited. But amid the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War, particularly 1982, 1983 they began to resurrect this program. And it always had a military dimension, meaning they were always interested in the military use, the military capability that a nuclear weapon would give them. So they’re obsessed with deterrence, that’s one of the legacies of the Iran-Iraq War. And they’re looking to have a shield, not because they’re a security seeker, not because they just wanna feel okay in a troubled region, but because they have a vision of what the region and the world should look like and they’re looking to export that and they wanna do that as safely as possible. Barbara mentioned that Iran, under two different regimes, has had a nuclear program for 50-plus years now. Why doesn’t it have a weapon? Because it’s looking to get this as safely as possible.

Barbara Slavin
I think also, you know, one thing we’ve learned from recent years is that having nuclear weapons is not a guarantee of security. Hamas staged a devastating attack against Israel, it wasn’t deterred by nuclear weapons. Iran twice attacked Israel, was not deterred by Israel’s 90-plus undeclared nuclear weapons.

Behnam Ben Taleblu
So then the Iranians shouldn’t be pushing so-

Barbara Slavin
Uh, Russia, Russia has, you know-

Behnam Ben Taleblu
… hard to get, to get a nuclear weapon.

Barbara Slavin
Well, you know, I think there is a debate in Tehran about whether it’s really worth it. I think for many in the national security establishment in Iran, it’s enough to be at the threshold, to have the, the capability to do it if pushed into it, if pushed into a corner. But I think they prefer to be in this ambiguous zone, this way they get the benefits of scaring people without the downsides necessarily of actually having [inaudible

:25].

John Donvan
Barbara, uh, uh, uh-

Barbara Slavin
And, and as I say, they just, they… What are they deter? We have wars all over the world that are not deterred by one power or the other having nukes.

John Donvan
What I, what I hear f- f- in your response to, uh, the question, Behnam, is that, uh, they have a lot of, a lot of reason not to wanna give it up.

Behnam Ben Taleblu
Absolutely. It’s a core national security interest for the regime, not for the population. But this regime, again, for status, they wanna be pushing back on the West, and for security, this deterrence umbrella.

Barbara Slavin
They won’t give it up, but they will restrict it. And that’s what we want.

Behnam Ben Taleblu
Do you trust-

Barbara Slavin
Yes.

Behnam Ben Taleblu
… this regime to have this kind of a capability? It’s two decades now that they have not lived up to the Safeguards Agreement.

Barbara Slavin
They abided by the JCPOA, we were the ones who cheated.

Behnam Ben Taleblu
The JCPOA is not the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, it’s not the comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, it’s not Code 3.1, and it’s not the Additional Protocol, nor is it the Additional Protocol Plus-

Barbara Slavin
According to our intelligence establishment-

Behnam Ben Taleblu
They did not even live up to Section T of the JCPOA.

Barbara Slavin
… according to our intelligence establishment they have not had an… a dedicated nuclear weapons program-

Behnam Ben Taleblu
I’m glad you mentioned-

Barbara Slavin
… since 2003.

Behnam Ben Taleblu
… I’m glad you mentioned the intelligence establishment because there’s been a critical change in intel reporting this year. For the first time a slight but critical change-

Barbara Slavin
(laughs)

Behnam Ben Taleblu
… noting Iran has undertaken activities that better position it to produce a nuclear device if it chooses to do so.

Barbara Slavin
If it chooses to do so. But according to our intelligence-

Behnam Ben Taleblu
But should we forever keep American-

Barbara Slavin
… establishment they have not.

Behnam Ben Taleblu
… policy hostage to Tehran’s whims? This is a critical point about being a great power, Barbara.

Barbara Slavin
Yeah. I just don’t think it’s, it’s that big a threat. I think Iran is in a very weak state. I think they want a deal.

Behnam Ben Taleblu
So let’s take-

Barbara Slavin
And I think they’re-

Behnam Ben Taleblu
… advantage of that weak state.

Barbara Slavin
Yes, and let’s make a deal.

Behnam Ben Taleblu
Applying maximum pressure 2.0.

Barbara Slavin
Let’s make a deal.

Behnam Ben Taleblu
Let’s multi-lateralize it. Let’s not let Tehran take advantage like it did during Trump term one, of the riff in the Trans-Atlantic community.

Barbara Slavin
Yeah. There’s something… There’s another point that hasn’t been raised and I think it’s really important, our Arab allies are in a different place now than they were-

John Donvan
That was the question I was gonna go to next.

Barbara Slavin
Yeah.

John Donvan
Okay.

Barbara Slavin
… than they were under, under Trump one. They don’t want a war, another war, yet another war in the Middle East. They have all made their peace with Iran, in one way or another. They’ve normalized relations, they are focused on their economic development. They would not support, uh, maximum pressure 2.0. And they most certainly would not support military action against Iran.

John Donvan
So let me, let me [inaudible

:34]-

Barbara Slavin
So the only one-

Behnam Ben Taleblu
You’re precisely correct that it’s an indictment-

Barbara Slavin
… who would-

Behnam Ben Taleblu
… of America’s regional policy, it’s an indictment-

Barbara Slavin
… the only one who would, would be is Israel. And I think we’ve gotten ourselves into enough trouble supporting Israel.

Behnam Ben Taleblu
I think we have quite a few victories to look at thanks to Israel. Uh, you might [inaudible

:47]-

Barbara Slavin
50,000 dead Palestinians.

Behnam Ben Taleblu
No, [inaudible

:49].

Barbara Slavin
Quite a heavy price.

Behnam Ben Taleblu
First of all, that’s Hamas figures. This is not a debate about Hamas.

Barbara Slavin
Quite a heavy price.

Behnam Ben Taleblu
Uh, we’re looking at the region, it’s a victory to have not the Assad regime in there. It’s a victory to have Hezbollah neutered in the fashion that it is.

Barbara Slavin
And Türkiye had more to do with that than Israel.

Behnam Ben Taleblu
Oh, absolutely Türkiye [inaudible

:01]-

Barbara Slavin
Anyway.

John Donvan
So lemme, let me jump in. Speaking of Türkiye and, uh, and again, and Israel and the Gulf states. You know, we have allies in the region who definitely have a stake in the outcome of this question. And, uh, [inaudible

:11] one could also say Europe is within reach of ballistic missiles from Iran at this point, potentially. Where, where do our allies figure into this? And particularly Israel because I know you’ve made the case in talking about, uh, being willing to use force-

Behnam Ben Taleblu
May I just begin with Türkiye? There’s a recent development with Türkiye which make it exceptionally timely, if I may begin with Türkiye?

John Donvan
Mm-hmm.

Behnam Ben Taleblu
Which is interesting ’cause it’s a NATO allied country. Recently Pre- President Erdoğan of Türkiye literally took a page out of Iran’s playbook, talked about the need for domestic production of a 2,000 kilometer ballistic missile. Iran is rep- so far the only country in history to have produced a 2,000 kilometer ballistic missile without first having developed a nuclear weapon. So Iran’s bad actions, bad behavior is having a contagion effect in the region. So if Iran gets the bomb, certainly it’s gonna have an effect on Türkiye which is a NATO country.

Barbara Slavin
Well, Türkiye’s under a NATO nuclear umbrella. So-

Behnam Ben Taleblu
Türkiye doesn’t feel like it’s been protected under Article 5 of, of the NATO Treaty because of the multiple issues it’s had with Syria. And it’s played footsie with Assad, it’s recently helped oust Assad. So they have real concerns about the West’s willingness to defend itself, which is causing more hedging in a very dangerous region.

John Donvan
I… So I wanna also focus on Israel because you have written that part of the, part of the argument for making a case for force is to assist Israel and being forceful. Uh, providing them with the weapons to do that, aircraft to do that, potentially refueling aircraft so they can make the trip.

Behnam Ben Taleblu
Well, the Islamic Republic has to believe that Israel would be unconstrained in the region. Again, when you see the regime’s fears in the region you wanna play up those fears, rather than try to spend time and political capital to constrain those fears and change Tehran’s impression of American policy or Israeli policy. You should play to those fears to foster constraint and restraint in Iranian behavior. And one way you do that is by leaving Israel’s hands open. Uh, one way you can do that very recently is by expediting the KC-46 aerial refueler to make sure that if Israeli jets need to go back and forth they have the capability to do that. Most recently the Israelis have struck further away in Yemen than even in Iran, the distance between Iran and Israel is about 14,000 kilometers, give or take. The distance between Israel and Yemen is about 2,000 kilometers, Israeli jets were able to do that.

John Donvan
What do you think would be the consequences for the United States of supporting Israel and if Israel goes ahead and carries out a strike?

Barbara Slavin
US would be then, uh, opening itself to attacks by a variety of Iran-backed groups in the Middle East. They would go after-

Behnam Ben Taleblu
But that’s been happening already.

Barbara Slavin
… remaining US forces… You don’t know what the consequences would be, you never can know what the consequences would be. I think it would be reckless.

Behnam Ben Taleblu
May I ask, o- over the past year, year and a few months, since October 7, uh, the US position in Iraq, Syria, and Jordan has been struck by Iran-backed militias already sans all of this, about 180 times. And the US has only militarily responded, you know, 10 to 13 times, depending on how you count. Would you support, at least at this stage, a more vigorous pushback against those groups without the nuclear umbrella and without Israel-

Barbara Slavin
I think first priority is for this-

Behnam Ben Taleblu
… taking preemptive action?

Barbara Slavin
I think the first priority is durable ceasefires in, uh, Lebanon and Gaza, which was another one of my recommendations to the president.

John Donvan
All right. We’re coming up for a break now. And when we come back we’re gonna go deeper into our question, cam America and its allies tolerate a nuclear Iran or is it time to stop them now? I’m John Donvan, this is Open To Debate and we’ll be right back.

Welcome back to Open To Debate where we’re taking on the question, can America and its allies tolerate a nuclear Iran or is it time to stop them now? I’m John Donvan and I’m joined by our debaters, Barbara Slavin and Behnam Ben Taleblu. And now we’re gonna bring in some other voices to ask questions of our debaters. These are people who are subject matter experts, they write about it, they think about it, they teach about it, and they’ve been listening to the debate and we wanna see what questions are prompted in their minds as they hear the conversation going back and forth here. And first I wanna welcome Zineb Riboua, a research fellow and program manager at the Center for Peace and Security in the Middle East at the Hudson Institute. Zineb, thanks so much for joining us. And please come in with your question.

Zineb Riboua
Hello. Thank you very much for having me. So with Iran supplying drones to Russia in its war against Ukraine, extending its influence in Iraq and Yemen where the Houthis benefit from Iranian and indirect Chinese support, and persist in despite setbacks in Syria and Lebanon, wouldn’t tolerating a nuclear Iran embolden a hostile axis of China, Russia, and Iran, posing a grave tragedy to US interests, not just in the Middle East, but globally?

Barbara Slavin
So you’re saying would it embolden further Russia and China if Iran gets nukes? Is that the question? Um, I don’t think so actually. I actually think that neither China nor Russia want Iran to get nukes. Uh, you may remember that they were very active in the negotiations that led to the JCPOA and I think they would support another nuclear agreement with Iran. Uh, Iran’s, uh, interests and Russia’s and China’s, you know, they overlap in some cases, but they’re not identical and there’s a lot of suspicion in particular between, uh, Iran and Russia. Uh, the Iranians had been blaming the Russians for the fall of the Assad regime, frankly. So I, I don’t think that, that that would be the case. I mean, I would hope Iran would stop providing drones to Russia, but then if they had sanctions relief they might not need to.

John Donvan
Behnam?

Behnam Ben Taleblu
Yeah. I don’t think the Iranians are providing drones to Russia because they wanna get sanctions relief. The Iranians are providing drones to Russia because for decades they’ve been trying to audition for the role of junior partner in this new anti-American axis that has been forming. I mean, you can go back to the 1990s and look at Iranian officials basically copy-pasting what would later be nucl- uh, Putin’s talking points about NATO expansion, trying to win favor and political cover, uh, from Moscow. So unfortunately in this instance, I do wholeheartedly agree, uh, with, uh, Zineb’s fears, premonitions about if Iran gets a nuclear weapon… And I would add a small footnote to that, which is Iran sits at a very interesting position between the Axis of Aggressors, which are states, North Korea, China, Russia, and the Axis of Resistance, which are sub-state, non-state terrorist groups. And I fear that an Iran with a nuclear weapon, under the auspices of the Islamic Republic, would embolden both, both the n- both the non-state and the state actors.

Barbara Slavin
Uh, again, I disagree. I don’t think it would give them necessarily any more, uh, power than they have. And of course, what they have is much reduced. And I think they’re providing the drones-

Behnam Ben Taleblu
Thanks to Israel.

Barbara Slavin
… they’re providing the drones to the Russians in return for, uh, jet fighters, which had been promised to them, other kinds of, uh, security and financial concessions. I don’t think there’s love lost.

Behnam Ben Taleblu
Uh, I certainly think that if you look at the past 500 years of Iranian-Russian history there’s-

Barbara Slavin
(laughs)

Behnam Ben Taleblu
… you know, turbulence, but then there’s a transactional period. And we’re living in the post-Syria period, which is the transformational period. And that’s where I think we have to look at this like a Venn diagram that’s only growing over time. And I would say, with respect and critically against the American alliance system, we do a bad job of managing alliances. The Axis does actually a pretty good job of compartmentalizing their rivalry, their mistrust, and playing up the area of where they do agree. And I fear that Russia and Iran are gonna continue to play up that area where where they agree-

Barbara Slavin
Well, Trump is gonna end the war in Ukraine, so we won’t have to worry about that.

Behnam Ben Taleblu
That’ll be disastrous. (laughs)

Barbara Slavin
(laughs)

John Donvan
All right. Zineb, thank you very much for your question, we really appreciate you thinking the time and listening in. I now wanna bring in Kanishk Tharoor who is senior editor at Foreign Affairs. Kanishk, thanks so much for joining and for listening to the debate so far. And we’re looking forward to what your question is.

Kanishk Tharoor
Thank you for having me. I have a very simple question, which is this, what would be worse? An Islamic Republic that has nuclear weapons or a direct war between the United States and Iran over such weapons?

Barbara Slavin
(laughs) Easy. (laughs) Uh-

John Donvan
I feel like that one’s made for you.

Barbara Slavin
That one’s made for me. I mean, the last thing we want is a direct war (laughs) with Iran. We’ve, we’ve, we’ve had skirmishes with the Iranians over the last 45 years, but we’ve managed to avoid a full-on war with, with Iran. And, uh, you know, uh, I was just thinking of that poor guy who blew himself up, uh, in front of the Trump hotel in Las Vegas. We have enough soldiers with PTSD, do we really need more? Uh, I think the last thing Trump wants is another war in the Middle East that drags the US in.

Behnam Ben Taleblu
Well, rightly the last thing the US or anyone needs is another war in the region, but sometimes you don’t get to choose the war, sometimes the wars choose you. And again, this has been not even a partisan political point, this has been a non-partisan political point in Washington across Democratic and Republican administrations to try to prevent the Islamic Republic of Iran from getting a nuclear weapon. And it’s precisely because of the political contagion effects in the region and geopolitically, both for the non-proliferation regime, as well as for US deterrence and security guarantees, uh, that would literally be at stake if the Islamic Republic or Iran would be permitted to go nuclear. And so while this is not an endorsement or a rush towards military action, the few times the Islamic Republic has ever revered course in its history, are never divorced from the credible threat and even the use of force. And we can’t forget that.

John Donvan
Do, do you think the, the two of you fundamentally have a different conception of the character of the regime-

Barbara Slavin
No.

John Donvan
… in taking these positions?

Barbara Slavin
No, I don’t think so.

Behnam Ben Taleblu
I, I don’t wanna put words in your mouth, but if I had to come up with a conceptia, it’s that this is an ideological regime, which is also very opportunistic.

Barbara Slavin
I would say it’s a corrupt regime.

Behnam Ben Taleblu
Well-

Barbara Slavin
Uh-

Behnam Ben Taleblu
… there’s lots of-

Barbara Slavin
… that had a lot of ideology at the beginning and, and mostly now it’s become about survival of, of the elite and the deep state.

John Donvan
Thank you, Kanishk. And now we have a question from Arash Azizi. Arash is a contributing writer at The Atlantic and the author of the books, What Iranians Want and also The Shadow Commander: Soleimani, the US, and Iran’s Global Ambitions. And so you have definitely been thinking a lot about this topic.

Arash Azizi
Uh, for sure. My question is for, uh, Ben. I actually think Ben and Barbara do seem to have a big commonality, um, I see that both of them would, uh, like to stop Iran, uh, from getting a nuclear weapon if, uh, and naturally if you can via diplomacy. So I’m surprised that while I agree with Ben that this is a sort of a moment of you can say submission for Iran, I totally agree with him that it’s the moment of, uh, chalice of poison, it’s the moment of, uh, uh, sort of coming to a deal with America, that Trump is a big opportunity for them. So I’m surprised that Ben, despite, uh, this, uh, believes that Trump should not directly, uh, engage Iran. If you want Iran to come to a deal, wouldn’t be, uh, you know, necessary to directly engage Iran? And also, what would you say to… Uh, and a sort of follow-up question, uh, would you think that this will sort of, uh, strengthen the hand of those factions in Iran that do want a deal, uh, with the US? And do you see any positive, do you see any factional realities in the Islamic Republic? Do you see there are some factions who might want a different future for Iran? Or, or do you not hold to that?

Behnam Ben Taleblu
So I, I believe there were several questions there, Arash. Uh, one was about factionalism. I believe factionalism is one of the drivers of Iranian foreign and security policy. I do not believe it is the main one. Uh, in fact, I would have to say with the nuclear issue that factionalism has managed to linger along, uh, whereas in other theaters it hasn’t been as colorful or as, uh, strong as ideology or the desire for regime survival. Uh, to that end, uh, but nonetheless, factionalism is part of the cocktail of forces that constitutes Iranian foreign and security policy, particularly under the auspices of the Islamic Republic. Where I would inject a voi- a point of caution however or a footnote to the reference of factionalism being a driver, is that we should not have to cater to the, uh, uh, uh, principlist reformist paradigm which even the Iranian population since 2018 has been saying, “Principlist reformists, the jig is up.” So I think in terms of US nuclear negotiating posture, we shouldn’t have to play, we should be colorblind, uh, we should be focusing on capitalizing on, uh, some say, you know, the tentacles of the octopus, uh, others say the head of the octopus, I say treat it as an entire octopus, capitalizing on the shortcomings, failures, and contradictions that are the Islamic Republic or Iran, and to that sense, be faction blind.

Now, to the heart of the question, which I think was about, uh, getting Khamenei to drink from a poisoned chalice and the dangling the credible use of military force. Again, in history, from the end of the Iran-Iraq war to even, uh, right up until the negotiation of the JCPOA, uh, the credible threat of force has played a key role. And that has to be heightened here. Now, in terms of opposing a direct, uh, Trump or US-Iran, uh, bilateral or back-channel, that may happen anyway, despite my best wishes, uh, despite my person views and beliefs, uh, but nonetheless, the US should focus [inaudible

:25]-

John Donvan
But what… Let me-

Barbara Slavin
Why

John Donvan
Why, why, why-

Barbara Slavin
Why, why does that bother you?

John Donvan
… do you oppose a, a direct-

Barbara Slavin
Yeah.

John Donvan
… connection to interact between Trump and Iran?

Barbara Slavin
What’s wrong with talking?

Behnam Ben Taleblu
I don’t think the President of the United States, who was recently attempted to be assassinated by this regime-

Barbara Slavin
Ai yai yai yai.

Behnam Ben Taleblu
… should be sitting down with members of this regime. There is no “ai yai yai”, you shouldn’t legitimize-

Barbara Slavin (

):
We killed Soleimani, for Christ’ sake, I mean.

Arash Azizi
Well, Ben, it’s a very strange position.

Behnam Ben Taleblu
And this, this equence it?

Barbara Slavin
No, and, and Iran’s, Iran’s assassination plots have been so, you know, Keystone Cops, uh, I mean-

Behnam Ben Taleblu
Just because it’s lackluster does not mean this regime-

Barbara Slavin
… they, they hire, they hire e- they hire Central Asian mafiosi who can’t even shoot straight. I mean, look, uh, we should-

Behnam Ben Taleblu
And that [inaudible

:00]-

Barbara Slavin
… not have these, these plots.

Behnam Ben Taleblu
Would that-

Barbara Slavin
We should not have these plots, for sure. They’re awful. Iran shouldn’t take hostages. But you deal with enemy you have, you can’t create a new one. This is our adversary-

Behnam Ben Taleblu
No one’s looking to create-

Barbara Slavin
… you have to talk to them.

Behnam Ben Taleblu
… new enemies, we’re trying to deal with enemies we have.

Barbara Slavin
Exactly.

Behnam Ben Taleblu
And that means-

Barbara Slavin
You have to deal with the adversary you have.

Behnam Ben Taleblu
… not legitimizing them and not empowering them. And when we talk about the [inaudible

:16] of-

Barbara Slavin
Talking is not empowering, talking is a way to get more-

Behnam Ben Taleblu
Usually, nine times out of 10 I agree with that. But the Islamic Republic has the-

John Donvan
Okay.

Behnam Ben Taleblu
… lower hand here.

John Donvan
We, we-

Behnam Ben Taleblu
We have to capitalize on it.

John Donvan
I have to jump in because of interest of time. But, uh, Arash, I heard you tryna break in. Uh, do you have something very brief to add?

Arash Azizi
I just wanna say that Ben’s position is very, very quite very strange. I mean, uh, you can’t say that, “Oh, yes, I believe that, uh, you know, I believe that it, that it would work to, uh, negotiate with Iran, to engage with Iran. But, um, because I’m personally opposed to it, uh, you know, it shouldn’t happen because it would legitimize it.” The, the fact of the matter is that-

Behnam Ben Taleblu
That’s not, that… With respect, that’s not my position, my position is that the Islamic Republic of Iran does not get to dictate the terms to the United States of America, certainly not Trump who’ve they been trying to kill. The deal, if there ever is a deal to be had on the table, is not an arms control deal like the JCPOA or the Agreed Framework, the deal has to be a full disarmament deal. And that is one that the Islamic Republic does not get to pick and choose-

Arash Azizi
So you do believe in a deal? Good.

Behnam Ben Taleblu
… and negotiate. (laughs)

Arash Azizi
So you do believe in engagement?

John Donvan
Okay.

Arash Azizi
[inaudible

:13].

Behnam Ben Taleblu
No.

Barbara Slavin
No, he doesn’t believe in it. (laughs)

John Donvan
I have to, I have break in. Arash, I need you not to be debating with the debater. But thank you-

Barbara Slavin
(laughs)

John Donvan
… very much for your question.

Behnam Ben Taleblu
What could be more Persian than that?

John Donvan
(laughs)

Barbara Slavin
Ah.

John Donvan
We have one more, uh, question that is coming from John Ghazvinian, uh, who’s PhD and executive director of the Middle East Center at UPenn and author of America and Iran: a history. Thank you, John, for joining us and for listening to the debate. Please come in with your question.

John Ghazvinian
Thank you. I’ve enjoyed this and learned a lot from it. Uh, my question is a simple one, Iran has repeatedly insisted that it’s not pursuing nuclear weapons and doesn’t want nuclear weapons. Now, we don’t have to believe them, but that is at least officially been their line. Uh, one thing that we do know is that it has, as Barbara says, consistently stayed within the NPT, it has not made the decision to pull out, uh, the way that North Korea did. It has con- repeatedly calculated that it’s better off operating within, uh, the sort of, uh, rules-based order of the NPT. However, uh, there has been a lot of speculation recently about whether Iran’s red line, if it has one, might soon shift. In other words, is there a potential scenario in which it would reconsider its nuclear strategy, uh, and shift from the pursuit of nuclear capability, nuclear ambiguity, to the outright pursuit of a weapon? What I’m curious to hear from both of you is, where exactly do you think Iran’s red line lies, if you believe that it has one? And do you think it has such a red line?

John Donvan
Barbara, take that first, please.

Barbara Slavin
Yeah. I think that the one thing that would get Iran to go for a bomb, uh, is if we bomb Iran. (laughs) Uh, the… you know, uh, they would leave the NPT, uh, they would rush for a weapon. There’s another potential scenario, the Europeans are talking about parties to the original JCPOA can restore United Nations sanctions on Iran and it can’t be vetoed in the Security Council. Uh, you know, I interpreted this as just another effort to, uh, convince the (laughs) Iranians to come to the table. I mean, and the Iranians have said multiple times that if sanctions are snapback at the UN they will quit the NPT. Then you have a period of three months, uh, before their withdrawal is confirmed where you could still have, I suppose, last ditch negotiations. So that would not be the end of the line, but it would getting very close to it. So I think snapback is one possibility, but for sure if there is a massive military attack on Iranian nuclear program, uh, that crosses obviously any red line.

John Donvan
Behnam?

Behnam Ben Taleblu
Uh, I actually concur with part of the, the formulation here, meaning that the regime is trying to prevent some of the most damaging things from being done against it by dangling the threat of NPT withdrawal. Another threat that they’ve dangled, a complimentary vector is the enrichment of uranium and the stockpiling of it to 90% purity or weapons grade. Both have been talked about in the context of if the US and its European partners trigger the snapback mechanism, which expires this October, as well as, uh, if there is some sort of preempted military strike, Israeli, American, doesn’t matter. So we both concur that those could be forcing functions. But also what I would add, is that the Islamic Republic is dangling is to quite literally prevent pressure. So it’s trying to wield, just like Putin is using the nuclear weapon in Ukraine, to exercise a veto over what the US can and cannot do in terms of support, it is trying to use that to exercise a veto that I believe it aught not to have on US policy to prevent more multilateral coordinated action.

John Donvan
John, thank you very much for your question. And, um, wanna thank all of our expert questioners for taking part in the program. But, uh, now we’re gonna bring it home with closing remarks. Um, Barbara, you are up first, make your closing, one last reason why America and its allies can tolerate a nuclear Iran, we recognize your position is more nuanced than that, but it’s also stark.

Barbara Slavin
Yeah. Uh, you know, I think I’ve laid out, uh, the reasons, uh, throughout this conversation, but maybe let me add just a- another sort of personal note, if I may. And that is that I have been following this issue, uh, really since the Iranian Revolution of 1978, I was a young journalist for The New York Times (laughs) writing weekly summaries of what happened in the revolution and then the hostage crisis, uh, all of this before (laughs) Behnam was born. You know, we’ve come tantalizingly close to reconciliation with Iran here and there. Uh, after 9/11 we had a particularly good opportunity which the Bush administration blew, uh, by putting Iran on an Axis of Evil after it just helped us get rid of the Taliban in, uh, in, in Afghanistan. Uh, I think we have another opportunity now and I think Iranians are sick of this, uh, divide between their country and the world’s most important power. Uh, the Israelis have, uh, scored, uh, some, uh, amazing victories at a horrible cost, but I think the Iranians understand that the Axis of Resistance is really no more, that they don’t have a viable strategy for this ideological foreign policy going forward, that they have to focus on their own people.

And I wrote another piece for Stimson after Assad fell about how now it was time for everyone to put their own country first. So if we’re gonna put America first, uh, if S- if Syria is going to put its interests first, Iran should put its interest first, it should get out of, uh, meddling in Arab issues. Uh, it should focus on the wellbeing of its own people. And it can do that in a dignified, thoughtful negotiation with the United States that resolve some of these issues once and for all.

John Donvan
Thank you. And Behnam, that gives you the last word in this debate. And you are taking the side that it’s time to stop Iran now.

Behnam Ben Taleblu
Sure. Thank you very much. It’s a pleasure. Uh, thank you again for the debate. Uh, in Persian we have a saying, uh, a saying that goes, “[foreign language

:42],” or “since when is hearing, uh, like seeing?” Unfortunately, when it comes to the Islamic Republic you have proof positive, words and actions. This is a regime that says “death Israel” and means it. This is a regime that has said for 45 years now, “Death to America,” and means it. And unfortunately they have put national reputation, blood, treasure, and everything else on the line in spite of the counter railing Iranian public good and national interest, which is 180 degrees opposite these two odious slogans. And so the reason I mention this today as a Iranian American is that there is one other reason that adds a sense of urgency, uh, to our debate about counter proliferation and with the Islamic Republic, is that tolerating a nuclear armed Islamic Republic, allowing the Ayatollahs, allowing the world’s foremost state sponsor of terrorism to have access to world’s most dangerous weapons would be akin to locking in, rather than working to roll back this odious regime. And that’s particularly, uh, perilous and morally dubious and strategically unsound at a time when due to energy issues, currency issues at home, the regime is being rocked.

And since 2017 you’ve had wave after wave after wave of nation-wide anti-regime protests of Iranians a drastically different orientation and world view. I say give that population a fighting chance against their clerical overlords and do not tolerate a nuclear-armed Islamic Republic of Iran.

John Donvan
Thank you very much. And I wanna thank you both. Barbara, thank you so much for taking part in-

Barbara Slavin
Thank you very much. Yeah.

John Donvan
… the program. Behnam-

Behnam Ben Taleblu
Thank you.

John Donvan
… thank you.

Behnam Ben Taleblu
Pleasure.

John Donvan
Really, thank you for, uh, for the way you conducted this debate ’cause it lives up to our goals sh- of proving that people can disagree with each other very seriously, but do so in a respectful and civil way. And you both, you both so hit that target so well. And I also wanna thank the, the subject matter experts who took part in the conversation with their questions. Zineb and Arash and Kanishk and John, thank you. And I also wanna thank, uh, you, our audience for tuning into this episode of Open To Debate. Um, I think you know that as a non-profit we are working to combat extreme polarization through civil debate, such as you just saw. And our work is made possible by listeners like you, by the Rosenkranz Foundation, and by supporters of Open To Debate.

Robert Rosenkranz is our chairman. Our CEO is Clea Conner. Lia Matthow is our chief content officer. Elizabeth Kitzenberg is our chief advancement officer. This episode was produced by Jessica Glazer and Marlette Sandoval. Editorial and research by Gabriella Mayer. Andrew Lipson and Max Fulton provided production support. Our team also includes Gabrielle Iannucelli, Rachel Kemp, Annalisa Cochrane, Erik Gross, and Linda Lee. Damon Whitmore mixed this episode. Our theme music is by Alex Kliment. And I’m John Donvan, we’ll see you next time on Open To Debate.