Robert Rosenkranz:

Good evening, everyone, and welcome. I’m Robert Rosenkranz,
chairman of Intelligence Squared U.S. Debate Forum, which is an
initiative of the Rosenkranz Foundation. It’s a very special
pleasure for me to welcome you today to our inaugural debate of
our inaugural season. With this series of live debates, and with
our national radio audience, we’re pursuing a lofty and ambitious
goal. We’re trying to raise the level of public discourse in
American life. We see a Congress that’s mired in partisan rancor,
we see much of the media increasingly ideological. We see policy
intellectuals in the think-tank world preaching to their respective
choirs, and the discussion of contentious policy issues
everywhere, dominated by intense emotions, rather than by facts
and reasoned analysis. But Intelligence Squared is not about the
search for bland middle ground. Rather, we want to encourage
each side of an argument to sharpen its own thinking by listening
to opposing views, and responding to inconvenient facts. We
want our audience, who voted on tonight’s resolution coming in,
to vote again after hearing the debate. As our great Judge Pierre
LeBeau said, “You know you have a mind, when you change it.”

[LAUGHTER]

Whether or not you change your mind, I hope you’ll come away
with the recognition that there is an intellectually respectable
position on the other side. For that is the real point of our
initiative. We want to promote a civil society in America that is
truly civil—where we increase our respect for opposing views, we
reduce our anger and emotion, and we call on the best within
ourselves, as we confront the challenging issues of our day.
We’re thrilled that WNYC is recording our series of debates, and
that through National Public Radio, you’ll be able to hear this
debate in most of the major cities across the country on local NPR
stations. My wife Alexandra Munroe commissioned the study
that was the first concrete step in this initiative, and she has
made invaluable contributions every step of the way.
We value the sponsorship of the Times of London, their support,
and indeed the excellence of the debates themselves is part of a
team effort. I want to especially thank our moderator Robert
Siegel, the voice of “All Things Considered,” and the extraordinary
group of panelists who are the true stars of tonight’s event. But
one individual merits special acknowledgement—our executive
producer, Dana Wolfe, a former “ABC News Nightline” producer
who brought extraordinary determination, intelligence, and
experience to this project. Thank you, Dana. [APPLAUSE] I’d
like to close by quoting two political leaders, one American, one
British. Al Gore, at the Clinton Global Initiative last week,
speaking on the subject of global warming as a crisis, said, “The
debate is over.” And now, Margaret Thatcher. “I love argument.
I love debate. I don’t expect anyone to just sit there and agree
with me. that’s not their job.” Well, at the risk of showing my
own partisanship, I’d like to declare a victory for Britain.

[LAUGHTER]

Of course Oxford-style debate is a long and vigorous tradition in
Britain, and Intelligence Squared was founded in London, where
it’s an esteemed institution and a major success. There it
attracts a live audience of 800 of London’s most influential
figures. I’m honored to welcome the founders, media
entrepreneurs Jeremy O’Grady, and John Gordon, and pass the
microphone over to John, who will share his thoughts and
introduce our moderator for the evening.

[APPLAUSE]

Josh Gordon:

Thank you very much, Robert. We’re absolutely delighted that
Intelligence Squared has come to America thanks to the
Rosenkranz Foundation. It’s great for the baby that Jeremy
O’Grady and I have been nurturing for 25 or more years and that
we created four years ago has now come over the pond.
]Intelligence Squared in London has really taken off. Everyone
there loves debate and even though it’s very much part of our
tradition, it’s not very much a part of the tradition in London–
there isn’t any regular series of debates other than Intelligence
Squared. I hope this evening you’ll enjoy the two particular
pleasures I think that we enjoy from the debate, one is that, this
is probably the first time that you’ll have the opportunity to hear
oratory. I mean there is very seldom—few outlets where you can
hear somebody speaking for eight or nine minutes in trying to
persuade you to vote for or against a particular motion. And I
think the other great sort of pleasure of debate, which again I’m
sure you’ll experience this evening—particularly if you’re
undecided as to the motion—is the great pleasure of hearing the
proposer arguing the motion, agreeing with them, and then eight
minutes later actually agreeing with the other side. And it’s that
intellectual ping-pong that is particularly exciting.
We’ve been slightly surprised by the enormous take-up of
Intelligence Squared, there’s been a vast amount of interest from
companies around the world interviewing us, writing articles
about it. It’s almost sort of emblematic of the stereotypes of
various countries, for example the French who have written about
it and interviewed us, are particularly surprised by the fact that
the speakers who are normally extremely rude to each other in
English debate end up going out to dinner with each other.
[LAUGHTER] The Germans who’ve interviewed us twice and
written an article in Der Spiegel, were actually surprised by
debate, full stop. [LAUGHTER] As a consensual society they’ve
just never really sort of experienced the idea of debate. And the
Japanese, with whom we did an interview on Tokyo FM very
recently, a live interview to 20 million people, in the course of the
interview it was clear that they completely misunderstood what
we were doing. [LAUGHTER]
They asked us, how many people have gotten married during the
course of a meeting. [LAUGHTER] They rather thought we were
a dating agency. [LAUGHTER] So we’re rather curious to see
how you are going to respond to this very quintessential British
sport of adversarial debate. I’d like now to hand over the
microphone to our very distinguished moderator this evening,
Robert Siegel. Robert is a senior host of National Public Radio’s
award-winning evening news magazine, “All Things Considered.”
He got started in radio news when he was a college freshman in
1964, and he’s still at it. As a host, Robert has reported from
Europe, the Middle East and all over the United States. He
served for four years as director of NPR’s news and information
department. I’m now very pleased to turn the evening over to
Robert for the debate, “We must tolerate a nuclear Iran.” Thank
you.

[APPLAUSE]

Robert Siegel:

Thank you, John Gordon, for your introduction, and I’d like to
welcome all of you to the inaugural Intelligence Squared U.S.
debate. I’d like to begin with some housekeeping. First the
obligatory announcement at all public gatherings— could you
please turn off your cell phones, pagers, PDA’s, things that beep,
talking toys or whatever else you might have with you tonight,
that might interrupt the debate. Also, if you have something that
you might be tempted to unwrap in the course of the evening, this
is being recorded for broadcast in radio, and the sound of
wrapping paper crinkling is often a substitute for crackling fire,
or it was in the old days. So please do the unwrapping now,
before we begin.

I’d like to explain the proceedings, what’s going to happen this
evening. First, the proposer of the motion will start by proposing
that side of the argument, and the opposition will follow. We will
alternate from the pro to the con side, each presentation being
eight minutes. I’ll be the time cop, and I’ll give them two-minute
and one-minute warnings, and if they keep on talking, I’ll tell you
to turn your cell phones back on and interrupt them.

[LAUGHTER]

After all six speakers have spoken and finished,
we’ll then have a question-and-answer session in which we will
welcome your questions, and also your brief statements, and they
will respond to you. When that question-and-answer session is
complete, each debater will make a final statement lasting no
more than two minutes. Now, during the closing statements we
then come to this perforated ballot-ticket that you were given on
the way in.

You were asked as you entered whether you were for or against
the motion or undecided, and once again we will ask you, after
you’ve heard from all of our speakers, to vote again, and you will
do that in a manner I’ll describe. If you don’t have one of these
now, we’ll take care of that when the time comes and the usher
will provide you with a ballot. Then after we’ve heard all the
closing statements, we shall announce the results of both the poll
that we took on the way in, and also the voting after you’ve heard
these, what I hope will be very interesting and persuasive
presentations. I’d like to introduce our panel right now. First,
those who support and propose the notion that we must tolerate
a nuclear Iran. George Perkovich is a U.S. foreign policy expert
and vice-president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace. Welcome. Karim Sadjadpour, formally
based in Tehran, is a writer and Iran analyst for the International
Crisis Group. Sanam Vakil is assistant professor of Middle East
Studies at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced
International Studies. That’s the side that proposes the motion
we’re going to hear debated.

To my left this evening, are Patrick Clawson, who is an author
and also deputy director at the Washington Institute for Near
East Policy, Reuel Marc Gerecht, an expert in Middle East affairs,
formerly with the CIA, currently a resident fellow at the American
Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, and best-selling
author and co-founder/editor of the Washington-based political
magazine The Weekly Standard, William Kristol. Bill Kristol
rounds out our panel. So let us start the debate, proposing the
motion, “We must tolerate a nuclear Iran,” George Perkovich,
please take the podium.

George Perkovich:

[Thank you. I’m intrigued by the “Dating Game” idea so maybe
we can return to that in the question part. It’s an evening event,
everybody’s tired from work. To judge the motion, “We must
tolerate a nuclear Iran,” you must evaluate the alternatives to it.
Ideally, the United States and other leading actors can prevent
Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Indeed, all six of us here
agree emphatically that the U.S. and the international community
must do everything possible, and more than has been done
already, to try to prevent this. We all agree with that, we all work
on that much of our time. We can talk about some of the steps
that that might entail, including the United States being willing to
engage in direct negotiations with Iran if Iran is willing to do so,
which is a big question. We should talk about security
guarantees to Iran, which Patrick has written about in the form
of, “We will not attack you if you don’t attack us.” We should
right now be mustering Iran’s neighbors— perhaps secretly, some
of it openly—into a much tighter, cohesive network to try to
cooperate on intelligence, air monitoring, perhaps moving ballistic
missile defenses into the region, to show Iran that its freedom of
maneuver will be diminished if it moves forward with nuclear
weapons.

We have to be much more direct with President Putin in Russia.
Russia is the biggest impediment of getting the Security Council
to take strong actions, and we can talk about that later. The
general point is, prevention, all of us agree, is the best option.
Yet prevention is not the proposition we’ve been asked to debate
here tonight. The question we are debating, is whether we can
tolerate a nuclear Iran. That question assumes that diplomacy
has failed, and we’re on to other options. Then we have to ask,
well, what are the alternatives to tolerating an Iran that possesses
nuclear weapons. Well, one might say, well, we kill ourselves. If
we can’t tolerate, we kill ourselves. That’s not a good option.
The second option will be, well, we’ll kill all of them. Make the
problem go away. Also not a good option, there are 74 million of
them, three times the population of Iraq. Even if somehow it were
morally justifiable, it wouldn’t necessarily solve the problem. The
most feasible strategy that is the alternative, the most feasible
strategy for not tolerating a nuclear Iran, is an attack—a
combination of attack on its known nuclear facilities, on its air
force and navy to try to prevent its capacity to retaliate
immediately, and on the Revolutionary Guard, to try to hasten
regime change. This ought to be examined, and there are a long
list of questions that arise from this. But the key thing in terms
of the motion before us is, that you should not assume that this
is a question of will power. In other words, if one says, “I will not
tolerate a nuclear Iran,” that somehow that solves the problem,
that the will power to act—meaning to conduct a war—somehow
achieves the objective of eliminating Iran’s nuclear capability.
There’s no reason actually to conclude that it would—that even if
you had the will, you could eliminate that capability. But you
have to factor that in, as well as the consequences of a potential
action. Now if I thought that a military attack of this type I
described would actually eliminate that nuclear capability, and do
it for a sufficient time, I would be for it, if the consequences of our
attack were not going to leave us worse off. But to conclude that
the consequences won’t leave us worse off, you have to ask a
bunch of questions. To his great credit, Reuel Gerecht, our
colleague, has written an essay last April in the Weekly Standard,
that’s a very detailed treatment of a military option, which he
ultimately advocates. Reuel talks about a campaign, a military
campaign, that he says would be “a series of actions and
counteractions between the U.S. and Iran, that would probably transpire
over many years, perhaps a decade or more.”

Now there’s a long list of questions that arise when you
contemplate a war with Iran lasting a decade or more. You’d have
to know if we buy some time, maybe two or three years, in the
first attack, what happens. Well, the most likely thing that
happens is the inspectors have to go, that’s been our major
source of intelligence. So now when you want to figure out what
else to attack over these years, your capacity actually to pinpoint
things has diminished. The probability of hitting false targets,
wrong targets, killing innocent people, being subjected to media
treatments then of the mistaken bombing, goes up, and with each
mistaken bomb, U.S. credibility in the world, in the region, in
Iran, is diminished. There are other questions. What are the
odds then an air war will improve the prospects for democracy in
Iran? What are the odds that another war will make Iran less
threatening to the U.S. and Israel?

What are the odds that another war led by the United States will
increase America’s capacity to solve the other problems in the
world—Iraq, Afghanistan, the war on terror, international trade?
You name the issues, will our credibility be enhanced if we
conduct another war in the Middle East? Now Reuel wrote his
essay before the war in Lebanon. I would argue that war has
even further raised the bar, the difficulty, of thinking that a war
against Iran will actually solve this problem. We believe that
another war would leave the United States and the world worse
off than we would be by pursuing an alternative strategy. If you
agree, you should vote in favor of the resolution. We argue
there’s plenty of evidence to conclude that if more energetic
efforts to prevent Iran from getting nuclear—

Robert Siegel:

Two minutes—

George Perkovich:

—fail, it will still be possible to deter and contain Iran from using
nuclear weapons against anyone. Iran’s president is alarming, he
is indeed alarming. But the leadership in Iran is collective, and it
includes many old men. These old men did not get old by being
suicidal. Iran, Persia, has thousands of years of grand history,
and there’s no reason whatsoever to think that Iranian
nationalists would sacrifice their nation and their civilization in a
nuclear war of their making. There is other evidence of Iran’s
deterability. Iran has not attacked the weaker United Arab
Emirates with which it has a dispute over two resource-rich
islands. Iran did not attack the Sunni extremist Taliban
government in Afghanistan, even when that government killed,
murdered, nine Iranian diplomats.

Robert Siegel:

One minute.

George Perkovich:

Iran has a Jewish population that is free to leave but chooses not
to. There is no evidence that Iran is not deterable. Indeed, as
Reuel has written, “The Islamic republic ceased to produce holy
warriors by the end of the Iran-Iraq War in 1988. The potential
for chiliastic rapture has just dried up.” The bigger point is this.
Voting for the motion does not mean doing nothing, or turning
the other cheek to Iran. Voting for the motion means deciding
that another war will not solve this problem, and that a robust,
extremely tough strategy of deterrence and containment would be
the most effective way to keep a nuclear Iran from threatening the
United States and its friends. Thank you.

[APPLAUSE]

Robert Siegel:

Thank you, George Perkovich, for proposing the motion before us,
“We must tolerate a nuclear Iran.” And now to the podium we
call the first opponent of that motion, Patrick Clawson.

Patrick Clawson:

I thought George gave a very eloquent statement of why we
should not go to war with Iran, and if that were the proposition
that we were debating, I think his arguments were spot-on. That
however is not the proposition we’re debating. The proposition
we’re debating is that we should not tolerate a nuclear Iran.
That’s quite a different matter. In fact, there are many things
that we could do, even if Iran got a nuclear weapon, that would
suggest to me that we would have non-military ways in order to
persuade Iran to give up that weapon. Most of the countries of
the world which developed—which had nuclear weapons have
given them up, and not through war. So there are in fact many
things that we can do, that would show we cannot tolerate a
nuclear Iran, short of war. So I would rather spend my time
discussing the proposition as stated to you, namely that we
cannot tolerate a nuclear Iran, rather than discussing whether or
not to go to war with Iran.
I would like to suggest that when it comes to a nuclear Iran, the
proposition is very well-stated, because it leaves vague exactly
what do we mean. Are we talking about the nuclear family in
Iran? Or what are we talking about here? [LAUGHTER] I for
one have no objections if Iranians care to choose to live in nuclear
families. But what we are likely to have is a very gray case. We
in fact do not have a smoking gun to show that Iran has a
nuclear weapons program. It’s unlikely that we’re going to wake
up some morning to find that Iran has exploded a nuclear
weapon. What we have to deal with instead, is what Iran openly
declares that it is doing—namely building this complicated thing
called a nuclear fuel cycle, to make the materials for having a
nuclear weapon.

The Iranians themselves have described well why they’re doing
this. In a remarkable speech, their chief negotiator for their
nuclear weapons program wrote that having a fuel-cycle
capability almost means the country that possesses this
capability is able to produce nuclear weapons, should that
country have the political will to do so. Now that’s the judgment
of the Iranian government. The Nobel Peace Prize-winning head
of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Mohammed Al
Baradei—who you may recall was no friend of George Bush on
the Iraq matter—says that if Iran does what Iran announces it’s
intending to do, that Iran will be, quote, “a few months,” end
quote, away from having a nuclear weapon. So our real question
is, do we want to see Iran have that kind of a capability, on the
edge of having a nuclear weapon but not quite there. We’re not
going to have the dramatic moment where Iran explodes a nuclear
weapon necessarily. If we need to act, we need to act much
before then. We need to act when Iran is getting this capability to
make the essential elements for a nuclear weapon. That is what
we have to concentrate on stopping.
Indeed, why do I think that that is something that not only we
cannot tolerate, but we need not tolerate. Let me count some of
the reasons. First is that what the Iranians are doing, is
exploiting a loophole in the system that we have constructed to
make sure that the world does not have a hundred countries with
nuclear weapons. The Iranians have correctly identified a real
weakness in our system of stopping the spread of nuclear
weapons. Indeed, Muhammad Al Baradei has proposed a five
year moratorium on the construction of all fuel-cycle facilities
worldwide, and has said that any such facility should be under
international control, because the technology is so dangerous.
If Iran gets away with building this, it will not be the only
country. We will not only have to tolerate a nuclear Iran, we will
have to tolerate a nuclear Turkey, a nuclear Egypt, a nuclear
Saudi Arabia. A nuclear Algeria. A nuclear Venezuela. A nuclear
South Africa. A nuclear Brazil. When we start having 20 or 30
countries with nuclear weapons, and we start having a multiple
system of deterrence, it’s going to be very interesting if we have to
go through the Cuban Missile Crisis another 20 or 30 or 40
times. I’m not confident it’ll turn out so positively every time. I
don’t think that deterrence is something that we can count on
working every time, the way it did work with the Soviets, once the
Soviets got so tired and Brezhnev took over, and couldn’t care
less about revolution. But in any case, I say we cannot tolerate a
nuclear Iran, because if we tolerate a nuclear Iran, we will be
tolerating many, many more nuclear countries, and that is not
something that will lead to peace in the world.
Furthermore, we need not tolerate a nuclear Iran, because there
is much that we can do to stop it without having to talk about
going to war. The fact is that Iran has acknowledged to the
International Atomic Energy Agency that it’s been carrying out
these clandestine nuclear activities for 18 years. But they haven’t
gotten very far. Now, a lot of that has broadcast our success, in
fact having a system which does limit what Iran can do. We have
had a lot of successes in our efforts in stopping Iran’s program.
You may recall that we were very worried when the Soviet Union
fell apart that its scientists and nuclear matter would show up
around the world, causing proliferation. We started a big
program called the Nunn-Lugar Program to prevent that. And in
fact, none of it has shown up in Iraq. None of it.
Indeed, the Iranians have had to, on the whole, do things
themselves. The only thing that they were able to buy was a set
of blueprints from A.Q. Khan of Pakistan. I don’t know about
you, but I can’t assemble furniture from Ikea when I buy it with
the blueprints. I certainly can’t program my VCR with the
instructions that come with it. So buying a set of blueprints
didn’t really get the Iranians necessarily that far ahead. Indeed,
that’s why their program has taken 18 years, and is going very
slowly. President Ahmadinejad of Iran claimed this last spring
that they were going to have—

Robert Siegel:

Two minutes—

Patrick Clawson:

—3,000 centrifuges up and operational by the end of the year. I
don’t think he’s going to have 300. And we can, by reinforcing
our system of controls on Iran’s access to advanced technology,
by mobilizing the world community, slow down Iran’s program
dramatically. To the point where Iran might be able to make one
bomb, but I don’t think it’ll be able to make a lot of bombs, and it
certainly won’t have a way to deliver that thing. And if this bomb
ends up being some two-ton monstrosity that they can barely fit
into a bread truck, then they won’t have easy ways of delivering
this thing. So, there are always ways in which the control on
technologies makes the real difference. That’s why we should
continue our efforts to limit Iran’s access to these advanced
technologies, rather than tolerating a nuclear Iran and saying,
well, now you’re in the nuclear club. Okay, join the club, you can
do what you want. No. We should, even if Iran’s program
progresses dramatically, continue to press them, continue to
work on them—

Robert Siegel:

One minute—

Patrick Clawson:

—and not tolerate it. Furthermore, as George laid out at the end
of his presentation, there are excellent reasons to think that, in
fact, the Iranian government is pretty cautious, in spite of this
Ahmadinejad of the moment. On the whole, right now the
Iranians think that they’re on top of the world and the strategic
situation’s very good for them. But that too will change, and our
job is to press them, press them so that the cautious element—
which I entirely agree with George is very much there in the
leadership—comes to the fore, and the Iranians decide that this
thing too risky, it’s not good for Iran’s security, and we can get
them to stop this program, or if the program’s advanced a long
way, we can get them to reverse it. Most of the countries that
have had nuclear weapons have given them up. So we do not
have to tolerate a nuclear Iran, we can get them to stop, or if
necessary to reverse.

[APPLAUSE]

Robert Siegel:

Thank you, Patrick Clawson. We now turn to the proponents
once again, and to Sanam Vakil.

Sanam Vakil:

Thank you. It’s a pleasure to be here tonight to tell you why we
must tolerate a nuclear Iran. It’s time for the United States to
rewrite the balance of power. Iran has been using its nuclear
program to bolster its legitimacy, domestically in Iran, regionally
in the Middle East, and internationally, And this tactic is coming
at the expense of American credibility and influence in these
arenas. So by engaging Iran over its nuclear program,
Washington can take this tool of coercion out of Tehran’s hands,
and once again have a larger degree of influence as well as
credibility within Iran, within the region of the Middle East, and
internationally. Let me tell you how Tehran is using its nuclear
program to its advantage. Let me start with the domestic.
By engaging, the U.S. would prevent the Iranian regime from
using the nuclear program as a pretext for regime preservation.

Through its domestic policies, Tehran has advanced its power
under the guise of this program. The administration of Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad is tactically manipulating its nationalistic nuclear
ambitions to foster support domestically. Important though, is if
you ask the average Iranian, what is nuclear energy, or what is
uranium enrichment, they wouldn’t be able to tell you. This is
what the government has homed in on. They’ve been able to
exploit the double standards that exist within the international
community, vis-à-vis Iran’s nuclear program, compared to India’s,
Pakistan’s, North Korea’s, and even Israel’s. This is what the
government draws strength. An edict was issued roughly six
months ago through the National Security Council preventing
negative media from being reported on nuclear issues
domestically, and the government uses censorship of media to
control popular access to any nuclear-related information, among
other information as well.

This way, the government has been successful in perpetuating
nuclear nationalism, and controlling the effect of that
nationalism. For Iran, the nuclear issue is linked to the nation’s
place in the modern world, national pride, and resistance against
the West. An effort to prevent Iran’s program from advancing is
further associated to discrimination, and perpetuated by fears of
sanctions and regime change. More interestingly, as I observed
this summer during my visit to Tehran, Ahmadinejad has more
support throughout Tehran today and in other cities on foreign
policy issues than he did last year after he was surprisingly
elected.

This is due to his confrontational approach, compared to the
policy of détente that was pursued under the Hatami
administration. You might ask why. That’s because many
Iranians feel quite happy and proud that he has taken on the
nuclear portfolio and succeeded in garnering more concessions
for Iran, compared to what was going on during the tenure of
President Hatami. So these confrontational tactics are also
domestic tactics pursued by the government, acts of deflection to
perpetuate a constant state of fear domestically, with regards to
sanctions and even a military strike, and these tactics are
designed to strengthen the hand of the regime and the unclear
program. This is why we should tolerate a nuclear Iran. We
should think about the Iranians at home that have to suffer
under the regime. The same time, the government is using the
opportunity of the nuclear threat to launch a domestic crackdown
on elites within the system. They’ve closed down reformist
newspapers. They’re purging universities of secular academics.
They’re detaining students. They’re purging bureaucrats from the
system. All in an effort to silence opposition, and all under the
paradigm and all under the guise of the nuclear program.
The regime is ever more united in the face of opposition. Let’s
also consider a counter-factual. If we do not tolerate Iran’s
unclear program, we are playing into the hands of Ahmadinejad.
He dreams of becoming a war president. Why was he elected? He
was elected on an economic platform. He was elected to be a
populistic President. But since he’s been in power for the past
year, he has yet to meet the demands of the people, and he has
been pursuing foreign policy issues, not economic ones. Any
nuclear strike, military strike, or sanctions would give him just
cause for continuing to neglect his electoral mandate.
So let me offer you even one more final reason why we should
tolerate a nuclear Iran on the domestic agenda. The government
is further playing to these domestic nationalistic sentiments of
the Iranian street, and playing up against the Iranian street that
has historically been very pro-American. They’re using their
imagery of the war, and they’re using fear of sanctions and regime
change to change the sentiment in Iran against the United States,
and this is a huge loss for Washington. Let’s turn to the region.
Ahmadinejad has also exploited the nuclear issue to no end. This
issue has gained a lot of support among the Arab and Muslim
street. He’s spoken of the double standards that exist among
U.S. policies in the Middle East. He’s taken on the plight of the
Palestinians, challenging the order in the recent war this
summer, and he’s earned praise in capitols from Cairo to Jakarta.
There’s also a credible—

Robert Siegel:

Two minutes—

Sanam Vakil:

—threat of proxy war. It’s a notable one, and the regime has
cultivated relations with proxies to counterbalance the very large
American presence in the region with two unfinished wars on
Iran’s borders. So Tehran’s message is simple—it’s a regime not
to be reckoned with [sic]. The U.S. is in a weakened position in
Iraq, Palestine, Lebanon, Afghanistan, and with this growing
conflict within the religion of Islam. Tehran is exploiting this to
its advantage, drawing on the Arab street for support at the
expense of the United States. Internationally. The regime’s
confrontational regional and domestic approach of the nuclear
program has also divided and weakened the international
community at Washington’s expense. Unable to unite the
international community and drive a consensus on sanctions,
only weakens Washington’s position further. Jacques Shirac
recently defected, and China and Russia are unable to back
Washington—

Robert Siegel:

One minute—

Sanam Vakil:

—on any sanctions in this nuclear jockeying that’s going back
and forth. Let’s compare Ahmadinejad. He’s able to rally 118
NAM nations to support Iran’s ambitions, and the United States
can’t rally the P-5 and the Security Council? That’s depressing.
So, Ahmadinejad says he supports dialogue, let’s take him up on
this offer. I leave you with this. The U.S. is losing the Iranian
street, it’s moving into dangerous territory in the Arab and
Muslim world, and it’s losing support in the Security Council.
Let’s take the lever away from Tehran. Let’s not allow them to
exploit their nuclear program at our expense anymore. Thank
you.

[APPLAUSE]

Robert Siegel:

Thank you, Sanam Vakil. Our next speaker, opposing the
motion, is Reuel Marc Gerecht.

Reul Marc Gerecht:

Bigotry against tall men. I just want to start off by thanking
George for using my own words against me. [LAUGHTER] I sort
of had the sensation of arguing with my wife and I inevitably lose
those encounters. I will suggest that perhaps he maybe used
some of my words a little selectively. I mean, I think Patrick
handled the geo-strategic issues rather well, I’m not going to go
back over those. I also am not going to go over a pointcounterpoint on the
individual repercussions of a bombing run. I
did that, as George said, at great length in a Weekly Standard
piece and there’s no reason for me to torture any of you here who
read it the first time through. But I will focus on a couple of
issues which I think tend to get overlooked, particularly in
American and Europe audiences. When I hear the other side
talking, I hear them talking about Iran as if it’s a status quo
country. I almost never hear them talk about God. I almost
never hear them talk about the religious inspiration that still
fuels the regime at the very top. What people have been
anticipating inside of the Islamic republic for the longest period of
time, is that it would go thermidor.

They thought it with Rafsanjani, who by the way should really be
considered the father of the Iranian nuclear weapon. They
thought it with him, even though at the very same time he was
unleashing the Intelligence Ministry, the Revolutionary Guard
Corps and assassination teams and bombing teams that went
around the world in the 1980s and ‘90s. They thought it about
Rafsanjani when he was calling these ecumenical movements,
bringing in Sunni militants into Tehran on a regular basis and
having outreach programs. By the way, Ayman al-Zawahiri, Al
Qaeda’s number two, has been probably Tehran’s favorite poster
boy for over 20 years. I will just add there’s something deeply
suspicious about members of Al Qaeda moving through Iran
before 9-11 and moving through Iran after 9-11.
It’s also very unusual for individuals who are under house arrest
in Tehran to be placing cell phone calls to operational units of Al
Qaeda in Saudi Arabia. That is not the usual routine that people
have when they’re under house arrest. I think we have to
understand that absolutely, when you deal with the vast majority
of Iranian people, certainly Iranian men—these are the ones we’re
primarily talking about—that that chiliastic drive that you saw in
the 1980s, they were really the mothership of much of the
jihadism mentality that we see today transferred over to the
Sunni world, it’s dead. It died. If nothing else it died with the
end of Khomeini who was sort of the charismatic inspiration.
Unfortunately for the hardcore and for the elite, it’s not dead. I
would argue it is as alive today as it was before.
That doesn’t mean, once again, that you will not find individuals
in that league who cannot be, quote, quite pragmatic. I was quite
struck by the commentary of the fellow on CBS, the very, very old
fellow, who went to interview Ahmadinejad and he said he seemed
like a very rational man. That is I think a very Western comment,
because we have this sort of false juxtaposition that individuals of
die-hard belief and faith cannot be rational. They absolutely are.
I mean Khomeini was a very, very rational man, he had a certain
love of Neoplatonism that people don’t talk about but he was a
more or less rational man. The same is true of Ahmadinejad but
Ahmadinejad is a die-hard believer. So by the way is Khomeini,
so by the way I would argue is Rafsanjani. What we have to
worry about, is in fact that the anti-Americanism at that level has
not diminished. You have to think, do you want to do what is
necessary to try to stop them from getting nuclear weaponry,
because you’re not primarily talking about an exchange of
nuclear weapons being a firing-off between the United States and
Iran. The Iranians realize that will probably end up very badly for
them.

What are you interested in is, will this give them an umbrella for
protection of terrorism. I think if you look at the Western track
record dealing with the clerical regime, that you have to say we’ve
done a very poor job of responding to them. In many ways we
have been at war with the Islamic republic since its inception,
except we have not responded. They have bombed, they have
attacked, they have killed American soldiers, we did not respond.
I suggest to you that what you’re going to see life they get nuclear
weapons is a new inspiration, I think it’s already out there, and I
would expect that Ahmadinejad is once again trying to do what
Khomeini and Rafsanjani had tried in the 1980s and failed.
That was to lead the radical Islamic world on a new antiAmerican jihad.
I think you’re going to see them try to do it
again, and the acquisition of nuclear weapon is a key to that
element. It is their safeguard, it is their protection. Once they
have that I would argue that in fact the odds of them being able
to strike the United States through proxies or directly will go up
astronomically. Should you take that risk? I would say no, that
you have to say, do you want to give individuals who run what I
would call sort of a more sophisticated version of bin Ladinism,
do you want to let them have the nuke? I would say under no
circumstances. Is it worthwhile to take the repercussion from
that in Afghanistan, which I don’t think are that much, in Iraq,
and I might add, the way Iraq is going it’s going to be so bad—

Robert Siegel:

Two minutes—

Reul Marc Gerecht:

—it’s going to be very difficult for the Iranians to try to make a
difference. If you are willing to absorb the repercussion of that, I
would say yes, absolutely, the nightmare scenarios that you
would have when you have this hardcore elite, which I would
argue will become more and more radical. Because in fact the
vast majority of Iranians have sheared away from the visions and
the dreams and the promises of the Islamic revolution. They are
not going in the direction of their citizenry, would that they were.
They’re going in the opposite direction. The people inside of that
regime, particularly I would argue the most important people, the
clergy, the dissident clergy that I would argue are still the hope
for that regime in the future, have in fact lost ground if not been
completely stuffed. I would agree with Sanam that public
diplomacy is a very good idea. The United States should try to
wage as best a public diplomacy as possible. But public
diplomacy is not going to—

Robert Siegel:

One minute—

Reul Marc Gerecht:

—the nuclear weapons issue. Would that we actually could
improve our position inside Iran, and I would just add by the way,
the United States has a far better position inside that country,
and it has maintained a relatively, if not pretty seriously hostile
position against the Islamic republic now for over 25 years, while
the Europeans have constantly tried to use engagement, yet their
position inside of Iran I think is far, far less. Hostility towards the
clerical regime has not cost us inside that country, it has in fact
gained us a following. So you have to decide, are you willing to
take a really serious risk, and I would add just tactically, you
have to say yes. Because diplomacy you know isn’t going to work
unless you threaten the possibility, you have to be serious about
it, of using military strikes. The only reason the Europeans—and
they will tell you that if you talk to the Germans and the French
and the British—

Robert Siegel:

Time is up, Reuel.

Reul Marc Gerecht:

Time’s up?

Robert Siegel:

We’ll hear from the Europeans later I think. Thank you very
much, Reuel Marc Gerecht. [APPLAUSE] Now our third and final
speaker in support of the motion, and that is Karim Sadjadpour.

Karim Sadjadpour:

Okay. Thank you so much for coming, it’s really a privilege to be
here and it’s a privilege to be personally speaking for Bill Kristol.
It’s a big privilege and a big challenge. When I was in high school
my father used to watch the Sunday morning talk shows. My
favorite guest was always Bill Kristol because he was always so
thoughtful and sensible and sensitive, I just assumed he was a
liberal. I must admit I was a late bloomer intellectually.

[LAUGHTER]

I would just like to first start off by reiterating the point that
George made, that I think all six of us here are after the same
thing at the end of the day—an Iran which is democratic, which is
free, which is prosperous, and which is not armed with a nuclear
weapon. That would be the ideal option. So the question is not
whether or not the Islamic republic is a cruel regime. It is, I can
tell you as someone who has been detained in Tehran by the
Revolutionary Guard, it is a cruel regime. The question is not,
again, why or whether or not Iran should have a nuclear weapon
we should tolerate. I think personally it would be disastrous if
they were to acquire a nuclear weapon. But the question on our
panel is, should we tolerate it, and that begs the question, should
we go to war with Iran to prevent it. Which cost would be higher,
to actually accept Iran acquiring a nuclear weapon, or going to
war with them to prevent it.
I would suggest that the latter option would be far more
dangerous, bombing Iran to prevent it from acquiring a nuclear.
I’m a bit surprised tonight that the other side of the table is
seeming to—I’m a bit too junior to contradict them too much—but
they’re running away from the argument somewhat because both
Reuel and Bill are on the record saying that they would bomb
Iran. So hopefully, we hear that from Bill in the next round.
[LAUGHTER] I would just argue similar to what Sanam said,
that if Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was here tonight, he would be
arguing on the other side of the table, meaning I think he very
much wants to see a confrontation between the U.S. and Iran.
I will just suggest why in three different contexts, why the
Iranians, particularly the hard-liners in Tehran, would like to see
a confrontation between the U.S. and Iran. The first context is
the regional context. What was very interesting for me following
the right-wing Iranian media was these comments which
Secretary Rice made after the war in Lebanon in July. What she
called it was “the birth pangs of a new Middle East.” When I was
following the Iranian right-wing media, it was very interesting
how much they agreed with Secretary Rice, they said indeed it is
the birth pangs of a new Middle East. Indeed this is a proxy war
between the U.S. and Iran for hegemony in the Middle East, for
Arab and Muslim hearts and minds. In fact we’re very wellplaced to fight this war,
and what’s very disconcerting right now
is that these same newspapers in Tehran which are very fascist
when it comes to domestic politics, are Jeffersonian democrats
when it comes to regional politics because they say, actually,
democratic elections are very much in our interest.
Hamas came to power in Palestine, Hezbollah came to power in
Lebanon through democratic elections, the Muslim Brotherhood
had a very strong showing in Egypt. Hardcore religious came to

power in Iraq via democratic elections. So in fact, we are winning
this war for Arab and Muslim hearts and minds, and given the
U.S.’s low standing in the region, it looks like history is now on
our side. Opinion polls which are conducted show that among
the Arab street, the three most popular leaders are Hassan
Nasrallah of Hezbollah, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad of Iran, and
Khaled Meshaal of Hamas. So right now Iran feels in a very good
position, and I think that bombing the country they would feel
even better-placed to fight this war for Arab and Muslim hearts
and minds.
We should take into account that if we bomb Iran, oil prices are
likely going to go up to $150 a barrel. Currently the regime is
making about $200 million a day on oil revenue, so we double
that, they’re going to make $400 million a day on oil revenue. I
would argue that that will put them in a far better position to
support Hamas and Hezbollah financially than if we don’t bomb
the country. I think that just, if we’re serious about fighting this
war, which is becoming very much this self-fulfilling prophecy of
the clash of civilizations, we’re going to have to figure out a way to
resolve our differences in the Middle East without using bombs.
The second point is from a non-proliferation perspective, from a
nuclear perspective. What would happen if we actually bomb
Iran to try to prevent them from acquiring a nuclear weapon.
Let’s play out the scenario, in fact I played out the scenario with a
Navy captain.
Say we bomb these sites. First of all we don’t know where many
of them are, some of them are underground, some of them we
don’t have intelligence on, so we can’t be sure that we bombed
the right sites. Second of all some of them are near population
centers, we would be killing Iranian civilians. Quite frankly, you
know, if you talk to nuclear physicists they say, well, Iran
actually has quite a bit of know-how right now. It’s like baking a
cake. They have the ingredients, they have the recipe, and they
have the cooks, they have the scientists. Unless you’re going to
kill the scientists, you’re going to kill the cooks, I mean, it’s going
to be very difficult to set back this program a long way. At most,
in talking to nuclear physicists, it will take Iran two to three years
to recalibrate. At that point, if we bomb them, international
public opinion may well side with them, and the Iranians may say
in fact we now are after a nuclear weapon because we now have
been shown that we need it to protect our sovereignty.
At that point, when you bomb these sites and you don’t know
where Iran is recalibrating these facilities, maybe underground, if
we really then want to avert the prospect we’ll have to send in
group troops. At this point, with our troops spread thin in Iraq
and Afghanistan, that doesn’t look like a welcome prospect. Now
from the domestic perspective, this is the one that for me I feel
most strongly about. When I first started this job, I didn’t get
involved in this work because I was passionate about centrifuges
and cascades and things like that, this is what George was
saying—

Robert Siegel:

Two minutes—

Karim Sadjadpour:

—but about the prospect of the future for the Iranian people.
There’s this widespread notion that all Iranians are in favor of a
nuclear program, which I would like to debunk. I think that, on
one hand Iran is a nationalist country, and many people feel
strongly that we’re a great nation, why this double standard.
India and Pakistan can have this project, why can’t we. But at
the same time this is a country that we forget experienced an
eight-year war with Iraq. Not really one family was left unscathed
by this war, there were half a million casualties. No one
romanticizes the conflict or the prospect of further militarization.
Quite frankly this is a very technical project, the idea of enriching
uranium as opposed to importing enriched uranium from abroad,
so the idea that your average Iranian in Shiraz or Tehran wakes
up in the morning and says, you know, if only we could enrich
uranium today our lives would be so much better half, has also
been very much exaggerated.

Robert Siegel:

One minute—

Karim Sadjadpour:

But I would argue that you present to the Iranian people two
options. You present this publicly to the regime. A, pursue this
nuclear program unequivocally, come what may, for the
sanctions, isolation, potential militarization. Or B, you take
certain nuclear compromises and you reenter the international
community. You’re going to have the people put a lot of pressure
on the regime to change their behavior, and so far this has not
been a policy option which has been issued by the U.S. Thank
you very much.

Robert Siegel:

Thank you. [APPLAUSE] That’s Karim Sadjadpour, and now
speaking against the motion, Bill Kristol.

William Kristol:

Thank you, Robert. Let me begin by thanking Bob Rosenkranz
for bringing Intelligence Squared to New York and to the United
States. I don’t know if Intelligence Squared has a slogan or motto
in London, but over here you might want to think about, “Fair
and balanced.” [LAUGHTER] “We debate, you decide.” You
might almost call this a no-spin zone here, you know. With
Robert Siegel, it’s Bill O’Reilly… [LAUGHTER] I shouldn’t have
said that, this will ruin his career on NPR, and I’ll never be invited
back to “All Things Considered.”
I personally came in undecided, um, as many of you did, and
even leaning slightly to the other side, but I’ve been convinced by
Reuel and [LAUGHTER] Patrick’s brilliant arguments. Bob said
he wanted intellectually respectable positions on both sides, and I
have a high opinion of George and Sanam and Karim. But I’ve
got to say that, unfortunately, they’re intelligent people but the
arguments, while respectable, are not convincing. I was put off
by Karim’s false praise [LAUGHTER] of me for a second, and I
salute Sanam for her genuine concern obviously for the Iranian
people who I think we all agree deserve a much better regime
than they have, and I think we all agree, we haven’t talked about
this, deserve much more aggressive efforts on the part of the
United States and other democracies and Europe could do much
more here, to help them liberate themselves from this regime.
George is one of the more reasonable Democrats in Washington.
I’ve known him for a while and he worked for Senator Biden and I
know that to be a fact, but the tip-off for all of you was when he
said that he didn’t believe we should kill ourselves. [LAUGHTER]

George Perkovich:

I thought that was the safe position.

William Kristol:

That was a courageous break from the mainstream of the
Democratic Party… [LAUGHTER] I want to pay tribute to George,
I’m doing my best to ruin all these people’s careers—

George Perkovich:

That’s the conservative position against euthanasia—

William Kristol:

I’m doing my best to ruin all of their careers. Look, we should not
tolerate a nuclear Iran. Three quick reasons, and a couple of
them have been touched on but maybe not developed. George
says, and I think everyone probably agrees that we have to be
tougher in our diplomacy, think more seriously about sanctions,
and move perhaps outside the Security Council to get sanctions if
we can, explore financial pressure to really squeeze Iran which I
think the administration is beginning to do. Secretary of the
Treasury Paulsen is working pretty seriously on this, and that
would be done I think outside the Security Council through a sort
of coalition of the willing on the Finance Ministry side. This is all
good. None of this will work unless it’s backed up by the threat of
force. Diplomacy will only work if there is a real threat of force,
not just saying options are on the table, but a sense that we
really won’t tolerate the outcome if Iran does not yield, if the
moderates to the degree there are some in the Iranian regime,
aren’t empowered by the pressure we’re putting on to prevent the
headlong rush to nuclear weapons, and manage to change course
domestically.
Diplomacy can’t work without the threat of force, therefore, it
would really be disastrous to diplomacy to say, we must tolerate a
nuclear Iran. So whatever people might think one would have to
do, and sometimes one has to do things in the real world seven or
10 years from now or three years from now I suppose, we should
not say we should tolerate a nuclear Iran and therefore you
should all vote “No,” just to help diplomacy along. [LAUGHS]
But I’m serious about that, and I’m serious that I believe
shouldn’t at the end of—I will satisfy Karim and say that I would
bomb Iran in a pinch. But it is important to not even signal
weakness.
The only reason the Europeans got serious in 2003 is that we
went into Iraq, that we hadn’t yet encountered the difficulties
we’ve encountered in the subsequent three years, and Iranians
were worried and the Europeans were worried that Bush really
would use force. That’s what made the Europeans much tougher
than it looked as if they would have been prior to 2003. So for
diplomacy to work, you need the credible threat of force, you
therefore could not say that we would tolerate, or certainly not
that we must tolerate a nuclear Iran. So for diplomacy to work
you need the threat of force. The credible, real threat of force.
Real plans, real attempt to lay the groundwork for it if it comes to
that. Secondly, deterrence. That is the ultimate argument
obviously on the other side, we can deter Iran, we deterred the
Soviet Union, we deterred China. Pakistan and India have
nuclear weapons and so far at least haven’t used them. That
depends on the nature of the regime. Is this the Brezhnev
regime, so to speak? Conservative, cautious old men, as George
said? Or is this a much more radical regime, or at least a regime
with radical elements in it, and do we have confidence that the
radical elements won’t prevail internally? I don’t think so.
This is a rising, confident, ambitious, aggressive regime, that
thinks it’s carrying forth a historic mission, sort of a jihadist
mission on behalf of Islam in general, particularly Shia Islam but
perfectly willing to work with Sunni jihadists and also to compete
with Sunni jihadists in radicalism which is itself very dangerous
and of course that’s the story in some respects of the last 25
years in the Middle East, with the Wahabes and the Iranians
competing to radicalize Islam and unfortunately, succeeding.
Letting Iran progress towards nuclear weapons just increases the
strength of all the worst radicalizing forces, the jihadist forces,
within Islam. It would be disastrous in my opinion not just for
Iran to get nuclear weapons. It’s disastrous for them to succeed
in progressing towards nuclear weapons over the next two, four,
six, eight years. Every month that we huff and puff and the
Europeans huff and puff and we put off another Security Council
resolution and they progress and Ahmadinejad comes here and is
treated well by the Council of Foreign Relations and—

Robert Siegel:

Two minutes.

William Kristol:

—and pays no price for anything he says or anything he does,
every month and every year that that happens, the worst forces in
the Middle East are strengthened, every government that’s
teetering and isn’t sure which side to join basically, our side, the
moderate side or the radical side, decides they have to cut a deal
with the radical side. Individuals decide that looks like the way of
the future, this is the classic, dangerous scenario. One hopes
that the more moderate people, the more moderate forces in the
Iranian regime, are going to prevail, and the only way to help
them to prevail, is not to reward Ahmadinejad.
That is what we are now doing by holding open the possibility
that we would tolerate a nuclear Iran. It’s not just that it would
be terrible if they got nuclear weapons. There, I think
incidentally, it’s not just tolerating a nuclear Iran, it’s tolerating a
nuclear Egypt and a nuclear Saudi Arabia, and then a whole
bunch of nuclear countries which itself creates a very dangerous
world. It is also the process of getting towards a nuclear Iran, is
itself extremely dangerous—

Robert Siegel:

One minute.

William Kristol:

I don’t like to use models from the ‘30s or the analogy of the ‘30s
or Hitler but in this respect it is like the ‘30s. Hitler’s success at
each stage strengthened him internally, he didn’t start out in firm
control of the regime of which he was chancellor. There were
others who thought he was reckless. Every time he did
something reckless and got away with it, it discredited his
internal credits, it empowered fascists elsewhere in Europe and
other regimes began moving in that direction. The democracies
became demoralized, we ended up fighting a war against a much
more powerful fascist alliance-axis than would have been the case
if we had acted much earlier. We face that prospect
unfortunately if we let a jihadist radical regime successfully
pursue nuclear weapons in the Middle East today.

[APPLAUSE]

Robert Siegel:

Thank you, William Kristol. I’m now ready to announce the
results of the pre-debate vote. Before the debate, you may recall
you were asked whether you were for or against the motion or
whether you don’t know. Here’s the pre-debate tally, for which
we will not need the U.S. Supreme Court to sort out the answer.
58 votes for the motion, that we must tolerate a nuclear Iran, 103
votes against the motion, and 58 don’t knows. So that was the
vote before the debate. We’re now ready for the question-andanswer portion of the
program. If you would like to put a
question to our panelists please raise your hand. Someone on
either one of the aisles will find you with a microphone. I’ll call
on you. As you’re asking the question, please stand up. If you’re
a member of the working press and asking a question, please
identify yourself. Otherwise it’s your call, and I’m going to begin
in the front row, with this young lady.

Woman:

Hi. I’m not sure how much of it is a question, but I think it is.
I’m on the “for” side, but I have to say the most compelling
argument on the “con” is, not the prospect of Iran having a
nuclear weapon but the prospect of Venezuela, Egypt. So I feel
strongly that yes, we must set a precedent, so that we don’t have
20, 30 nations with nuclear weapons. But then I wonder, how
realistic is that? You look at the nations that are pursuing
nuclear weapons, and these are nations that feel marginalized
and threatened. It’s definitely I think a pursuit, both for
protection and also for machismo or for popularity in their home.
So is it really realistic to think that we are going to now have 10
more nations with nuclear weapons in the 10, 20 years? The
kind of comment along with that too is there’s an interesting
vicious cycle that’s set in place when, by starting another war you
are creating this vicious cycle of other regimes feeling threatened,
and then spurring them on to produce nuclear weapons. Will we
be giving Chavez more of an impetus to get into the nuclear
weapon battle?

Robert Siegel:

Well, since the argument of the one-too-many nuclear Irans was
made by the opponents, may I ask the supporters of the motion,
George Perkovich, to answer it. Does tolerating a nuclear Iran
imply tolerating many other new nuclear powers?

George Perkovich:

Well, I think we’ll come to this later. We’re now confused about
what it means to tolerate or not to tolerate, because I happen to
agree with everything Patrick said because he didn’t talk about
going to war. I agree with Reuel and Bill, we should do everything
we can to try to prevent it. So if what we mean by “tolerating” is
that we really, really don’t like it, we’re going to do everything we
can to stop it, but we would accept living with it if that was the
alternative other than war, then I think we agree. If the
alternative really is what Bill said, but not what Patrick said, that
not tolerating it means that you are willing to go to war over it,
then I would say to your question, there’s only been one case in
history where there was a military effort to stop a country from
trying to get nuclear weapons.
That was the Israeli bombing of Iraq in 1981. You can argue
what the effects of that were in various ways. Iraq went to war or
was at war with Iran, and then, we had another war with them in
’91 and then we had another war with them in 2003, and their
nuclear program continued when we didn’t think it was from ’81
to ’91, but when we thought it was or some people thought it was,
it turned out it wasn’t. We’re there now. Every other case of
getting a country to stop involved politics, negotiations, giving
them benefits, security guarantees, trade-offs, and deals. So we
should be concerned about if Iran succeeds, what happens. But
the way the rest of the world’s going to respond to this is going to
be if you marshal diplomatic pressure, economic sanctions, plus
rewards. That’s the way to do it.

Robert Siegel:

Reuel Marc Gerecht, why don’t you reply to what George
Perkovich is saying.

Reul Marc Gerecht:

I would just like to say that I’m very uncomfortable being in the
majority if that poll is correct. I think the other side should
demand a recount. But I mean, just a quick comment on that. I
don’t think it’s any coincidence that Gamal Mubarak announced
that Egypt is going to have a civilian nuclear program. I think the
timing of that, because of the Iranian nuclear program, was
intentional. I would add that there’s a great deal of suspicion
that the Saudis were in part financial backers of the Pakistani
nuclear program. It is impossible I think to overestimate the
fierce hatred and competition that exists and has existed between
Saudi Arabia and the Islamic republic from 1979, Bill alluded to
it.

Much of the Islamic militancy that we see today, the fuel behind
bin Ladinism, actually grew out of that competition in the 1980s.
It would be surprising not to see the Saudis make some play for a
nuke. I would also add, I wouldn’t at all be surprised to see
Turkey go in a nuclear direction. I think the Iraq war certainly
showed to the Turks they cannot rely upon NATO as an
institution of their defense, and I think the animosity that does
exist in Turkey, even if it goes in a more Islamic direction which I
think it will, will not diminish its profound suspicions of the
Islamic republic. I think it would be a good guess that the Turks
too would start working on a nuclear program.

Robert Siegel:

Next question, do we have someone on that side? Won’t you
hand the microphone…and then we’ll come over to the other side
of the room next. Could you stand up, please.

Eugene Linden:

Eugene Linden’s my name. Given the present situation in Iraq
and Afghanistan, and the possibility of $150-a-barrel oil, do we
really have a credible military threat?

Robert Siegel:

You mean does, is the threat from the United States credible?
Patrick Clawson.

Patrick Clawson:

In a word, yes. First off, if the United States military were to take
action Iran’s nuclear sites, this would be the Navy and the Air
Force, which are not overly committed in Afghanistan and Iraq. It
would be quite a doable thing to destroy the key nodes in Iran’s
nuclear program. We don’t have to flatten the whole thing, don’t
have to go in and Dresden and knock it all down. We just have to
knock out the key nodes, and there are some key nodes without
which that program cannot function, and it would take a number
of years to rebuild. The question arises as to what Iran’s
response would be if we did this. Well, we don’t know, it would
depend upon the circumstances.
But I would suggest that there was a time when in fact as far as
the Iranians are concerned, we did bomb them, and we did take
military action against them. That’s the end of the Iran-Iraq war,
when we after all, in what we see as a tragic accident, shot down
an Iranian airbus and killed 200-plus Iranian civilians. But they
saw that very bluntly as the United States entering the war.
Indeed, this being holy defense week, and the Iranian newspapers
have been full of interviews with people about the war and how it
happened, and Rafsanjani has asked, well why did you end the
war? Because America ended the war against us. So the fact is
that the last time we bombed Iran the result was within a week,
that the Iranians accepted a cease-fire, it stopped a war which
had killed 700,000 people. We paid no price in our relationships
with the Iranians. That’s because the Iranian people were sick
and tired of that war. So the task is up to us to paint this
nuclear weapon as the device which the mullahs are using to
consolidate their power and their control and to keep their grip on
the country. Because if Iranians perceive that what we are doing
is getting rid of the tool by which the mullahs are going to
consolidate their control, that’s a very different situation than if
Iranians think that this is a national bomb needed for national
defense.

Robert Siegel:

I wanted to see if the other side agrees that there is a credible
military threat, no ground troops, simply air strikes. Karim.

Karim Sadjadpour:

Obviously the United States is powerful enough to bomb Iran,
that’s not the question. The question is the day after we bomb
Iran, just like the question in Iraq should have been the day after
we bomb Iraq. Obviously the United States could change
probably every regime in the world apart from a few, China,
Russia, India. But what are the repercussions for the day after?
I would argue that at the moment even the Iranians believe that
Iranian soft power is dominating U.S. hard power in Iraq. I would
just put on the table that it’s fundamentally incompatible to think
we’re going to stabilize Iraq, while simultaneously dropping
bombs on Iran, not to mention other countries in the region. If
we really want to try to tranquilize Lebanon, we will see a
resurgent Hezbollah if we drop bombs on Iran. We want to
tranquilize Palestine and strengthen the moderate Palestinians
we’re going to strengthen Hamas, if we do that. I just want to
make a further point that, Bill and Reuel have written that it’s
unclear what would happen domestically within Iran if we
dropped bombs. Maybe actually, we could over time strengthen
the Iranian moderates. This always reminds me of a quote from
John Limber, the great U.S. diplomat who was actually taken
hostage in Iran for 444 days during the 1979 revolution.
He was someone like many Iranians, my father included, who
believed that when the Shah was deposed, the Shah’s government
would be replaced by a secular democracy, and what we saw of
course was that Khomeini came to, to power. He later wrote in
his memoirs that, that what he learned was that when sudden
upheavals happen, revolutions are not won by those who can
write incisive op-ed pieces. [LAUGHTER] I think likewise in Iran
we should have no illusions that if we bomb the country it’s going
to be moderates who come to the helm either within Iran or
within the region.

Robert Siegel:

Sanam Vakil?

Sanam Vakil:

Could I just add one more thing. If we also think about bombing
Iran, we also have to think about not just nuclear nationalism
that persists within the country, but just inherent nationalism,
the patriotism of Iranians that they feel for their country, Iranians
who don’t even love the regime but love Iran. The same way that
you might love the United States of America or wherever you’re
from. These are the Iranians that will come out in defense of
their country. There are many Iranians I spoke with this
summer, that said in the event of a military strike, they would
come out in defense of their country and that’s something that we
should consider. These are the people that fought an Iran-Iraq
war, not for two years, not for four years, for eight long years.
And that same way that you, your sons and your children would
come out and defend the United States in the event of a military
strike.

Robert Siegel:

Reuel Gerecht?

Reul Marc Gerecht:

Yes, I don’t think anyone on this side of the table believes that
bombing Iran will produce a moderate revolution inside the
country, and in fact I think we’d say that’s really not the issue at
all. The issue is do you believe that an Islamic republic armed
with nuclear weapons is going to help the United States stabilize
Iraq. I think that is not at all true, just the opposite. As long as
the radical forces inside of Iran gain power and gain will, I think it
is impossible to imagine a situation inside of Iraq that is going to
be stable and in any way pro-American. I think you will see the
forces of radicalism inside the Iraqi Shia community, continue to
gain ground, they’re becoming a dominant force in that society,
and Iran has no intention of deterring them. Certainly an Iran
armed with nuclear weaponry, I don’t think would be a force of
moderation inside Iraqi politics.

Robert Siegel:

Our next questioner? Sir.

Man:

I’m very sympathetic obviously to the “con” side. But I think one
question has to be answered, which is: at this present time, what
are you going to do about Western Europe. What are you going to
do about the Europeans in terms of their support or non-support
for this kind of event, and the reality that in another two years
we’re going to have another election. Blair is on his way out,
clearly the sense or spirit of accommodation is reflected I think in
both the Labour Party and in the Conservative Party. So rather
than just thinking in terms of next month, what is one’s answer
to the question, how can we really threaten this unilaterally if we
cannot bring any of the major powers in Europe along with us.

Robert Siegel:

Bill Kristol, what’s the answer to that question.

William Kristol:

The only reason the major powers in Europe are as engaged as
they are diplomatically and at least talking, some of them,
sometimes, about sanctions, on Iran is that in fact they were
worried in 2003 that we might use force. As the threat of force
has receded, as we’ve been so reassuring in the last year and
embraced diplomacy and made clear to the Europeans that we
put getting along with Europeans I think unfortunately perhaps
at a higher level of priority than actually dealing with the Iranian
nuclear program, they of course have cheerfully backed off.
They’re not going to be ultimately extremely helpful in this. They
will not privately shed any tears for the Iranian nuclear program
and I don’t think we’ll have any great rupture in NATO, we’ll still
have peacekeeping forces in Afghanistan. But no, they will
probably not be part of the mission, and they will in some
ritualistic way, probably denounce it. But if a nuclear Iran is
really dangerous and I think it is, we can’t be stopped by the
lowest common denominators of our allies. The unfortunate
truth, I wish Western Europe were different, I wish all of Europe
were somewhat different, I wish they spent more on the military, I
wish they were more serious about dealing with coming threats
from outside their region. They’re not, and we have to take the
lead.

Robert Siegel:

Our next question, from the gentleman in the center.

Van Greenfield:

Van Greenfield. I voted against to start, I’m still there now. I
think that when we recount again, if Karim and Sanam actually
listen to their own words, then the people against will pick up two
votes. I’m very serious about that. I think that Sanam said that
Ahmadinejad dreams of becoming a war president. I fully agree
with that, completely support that, I think that he believes it with
his heart and soul. If he does feel that way, and has a nuclear
weapon, we’re much worse off. Karim’s comment was that Iran
getting a nuclear weapon would be disastrous. If it’s disastrous if
they get it, and if he dreams of becoming a war president, I don’t
see how you don’t vote that way. The question I’d like to ask is,
as I sit here I was kind of astounded that we heard about virtually
every country on the globe here, but the one country that we
didn’t hear anything about, or any effect about, the country in a
way most affected by the words that have been spoken, is Israel.
Robert, you can choose who would answer it, but where do Israel
and our obligation to Israel factor into this? I mean, they have to
believe the words—

[BRIEF AUDIO DROP-OUT]

Robert Siegel:

—in the presentations, but first I should say that Sanam and
Karim, you’ve been called upon to debate your own remarks.
[LAUGHTER] If there’s something you’d like to say first, feel free
to.

Karim Sadjadpour:

I stand by the statement that it would be a disaster if Iran were
acquire a nuclear weapon, but I would just say it would be far
more disastrous to bomb them to try to prevent them from
acquiring a nuclear weapon. These are the scales we’re forced to
measure right now. I think Bill and Reuel and Patrick would
agree that as long as this government is in power in Tehran, they
will never feel comfortable that it’s somehow lost its nuclear
ambitions. As long as this government is in power I think they’ll
always feel that will happen. My point is that if we bomb Iran,
we’re going to prolong the life of this regime I would argue two,
three, maybe four decades. That what’s going to happen is that
these radicals are going to come to the helm, they’re going to
clamp down on any type of moderates, and they’re going to have
the pretext to do so. So if you want to preserve the shelf life of
this regime then we bomb it, that’s my argument.

Robert Siegel:

Sanam, does President Ahmadinejad need U.S. provocation to
become a war president or war leader, or will he become one on
his own?

Sanam Vakil:

Oh, no, he’s begging the U.S. to do it. He’s not there just yet. I
think you misinterpreted. He’s looking for the U.S. to bomb Iran
so he can avoid the economic mandate, his populistic mandate of
why he was elected. He is not going to be able to fill the plates of
74 million Iranians. And so foreign policy issues are a nice
method of deflection for this president. Bombing Iran would
propel this radical president to a higher post. The presidency of
Iran is never, historically and constitutionally, a strong position,
and we’re making him stronger every day by paying attention to
him. If we bomb the country, he will be propelled even more. We
will be radicalizing the country in his favor even more, and he will
be neglecting his economic mandate, and the fastest way to get
him out of power will be to force him to focus on the economic
issues that he was elected into office on.

Robert Siegel:

Patrick Clawson, to what degree is this about the threat perceived
by Israel from Iran.

Patrick Clawson:

Well, first you’ll notice that the other side continually does not
debate the proposition. They debate a very different proposition.
The proposition they debate is we should not bomb Iran. Now if
that were the question we were debating, it would be an
interesting debate. But it’s not what we’re here to do tonight.
The question is, do we tolerate Iran’s nuclear program. That’s
like saying, are we going to have the attitude towards an Iranian
nuke that we have towards an Indian and a Pakistani nuke. We
tolerate that. We say, naughty-naughty, you shouldn’t have done
that, but we tolerate it. The question is, are we going to have that
kind of an attitude, or are we, as Bill said, going to use instead
the threat of force in order to back up diplomacy. Bill didn’t call
for bombs away, neither did I, and neither did Reuel. What we
called for is to have—

William Kristol:

I wouldn’t—let’s not go too far here. [LAUGHTER] We have a
diversity of views on this side too, you know.

Robert Siegel:

Some of your teammates are on the record on this— [LAUGHTER]

Patrick Clawson:

There was a wonderful Commentary article by Ed Lutfoch in
which he said it’s not time to bomb Iran, yet. It may come to be
the time. But it’s not yet the time. Because what we’re talking
about is how we can use force in order to—the threat of force in
order to back up that diplomacy.

Robert Siegel:

But George Perkovich, you’re the pessimist about the diplomacy.
You’re the one who’s saying it’s going to end up as an attack or
not an attack.

Patrick Clawson:

That’s in part because of the Israel question. The answer is
because Israel evaluates the threat to it as much worse than the
threat to us. Then it’s quite possible that Israel will decide that
it’s got to attack Iran well before we decide to attack Iran. In fact
I would say that that’s likely that Israel will decide that it has to
attack Iran, long before we think we have to attack Iran. That’s
going to force the issue about what to do about this. Well, it’s
precisely because we don’t want to be in that situation that we
have got to accelerate our efforts on the diplomacy, and we can
use Israel as that mad dog the threat of which we wave in front of
the Europeans in order to get them to be more serious about this
matter.

Robert Siegel:

George Perkovich.

George Perkovich:

We don’t disagree with that, that we have to accelerate and
toughen diplomacy, that we don’t want Iran to have nukes, all of
that we agree with. But what does it mean to not tolerate
something?

Patrick Clawson:

Step up all those efforts.

George Perkovich:

I agree, and then if those don’t fail, what does it mean not to talk.
Bill says it means go to war. Reuel has said it means go to war.
Patrick hasn’t quite said that, so I’m not clear what the resolution
is.

Willaim Kristol:

We have a healthy diversity of views on our side, we don’t insist
on orthodoxy unlike some people, you know.

Patrick Clawson:

George, you’re saying, don’t tolerate it. You’re saying take action
against it. Well, this proposition is not, go to war with Iran.
That’s not the proposition we’re debating.

William Kristol:

May I make a point, a substantive point—

George Perkovich:

But what you’re saying is pretend not to tolerate it.

Patrick Clawson:

No, no, no, no. We shouldn’t tolerate it—

George Perkovich:

And then maybe at some point you tolerate it, and Bill says—

Patrick Clawson:

No, no, we shouldn’t—

William Kristol:

This is a semantic debate—

Robert Siegel:

To clarify, Patrick Clawson, you’re saying, worst case, if all the
diplomatic measures you’re talking about don’t succeed, then
you’ll tolerate it.

Patrick Clawson:

No. Worst case, if the only way we can make the diplomatic
measures succeed, as Bill has said, is if we say at the end of the
day if they don’t we’ll use force. Because the only way we can
make diplomacy work is if we say at the end of the day, we are
prepared to use force. That is what we should be doing. But the
other side has not said about—George says, we should press
them, press them. How the heck are you going to press them, if
you say at the end of the day that what we’re prepared to do, is
tolerate it. They’re not going to be interested in being friends.

William Kristol:

Can I say a word on this, this is just semantics. Look, the
serious argument and most respectable argument I would say on
the other side is Karim’s, that bombing would prolong the regime,
would strengthen the regime. I take that argument very
seriously. Ahmadinejad successfully pursuing and acquiring
nuclear weapons in my view would strengthen the regime and
strengthen the radical elements in the regime, much more surely
than bombing would. Bombing is of course, you don’t know what
effects. There’s empirical, historical evidence of the use of force
destabilizing and discrediting a radical and aggressive regime,
and there are historical examples of nationalist tempers flaring at
least for a while, and the radicals being strengthened. I wouldn’t
want to stipulate one or the other, but the one thing I think we
can stipulate is that letting the most radical elements pursue
nuclear weapons successfully would in fact strengthen the
regime. So I think if you care about ending the regime which is
what one has to care about, one has to be serious about saying
we don’t tolerate this regime, this Iranian regime acquiring
nuclear weapons, and then acting if necessary to prevent it.

Robert Siegel:

Karim Sadjadpour.

Karim Sadjadpour:

I’d argue that at the end of the day what’s going to change this
regime is economic malaise. It’s not going to be bombing it, it’s
not going to be a nuclear issue, but similar to the Soviet Union, at
the end of the day you can’t eat a nuclear weapon. That’s what’s
going to change this government, but again I think that if we do
give it a pretext to clamp down on its domestic population it will
very much take it, and we could see the prospect of change
moved back many years. I would just argue as well that if we
somehow were able to manage a nuclear-armed Soviet Union and
a nuclear-armed China, which had far greater appetite than Iran
did, it seems to me preposterous that we can’t tolerate a nucleararmed Iran in this context, in the context of deterrence.

Robert Siegel:

Well, thank you both, thank you all very much for commenting on
our audience’s questions, and for clarifying the semantics of the
motion, or muddying the semantics of the motion, I’m not sure
which. [LAUGHTER] I’m intrigued by the idea that Bill Kristol
came here undecided, and is newly won over to the “con” position.
[LAUGHTER] Which would make him a neocon, finally.
[LAUGHTER, APPLAUSE] It’s now time to vote. You may think
you’ve voted before but you’re going to vote again. This is the
ticket you were given on the way in, and all of you should have
one. If you don’t, don’t worry, an usher will provide you with one
now. There are three possible votes you may cast with this.
Someone’s going to come by with a ballot box. If you’re for the
resolution, take off the green “for,” it’s perforated, and drop that
in the box. If you’re against, the red. If you’re still undecided, or
if you are now undecided, drop the entire untorn ballot into the
ballot box. As you do that, let’s make sure that the ballot boxes
are making their way around the auditorium. In a moment, we
shall hear brief concluding statements from our six panelists.
What sort of progress are the ballot boxes making.

[PAUSE, VOICES]

Robert Siegel:

Good. Good. We heard earlier from each of our panelists with an
opening statement that began with those supporting the motion.
We’re now going to hear brief concluding statements, of no more
than two minutes each, beginning with those who are against.
We start with Patrick Clawson. Patrick?

Patrick Clawson:

According to the New York Times when Kofi Annan was in Iran at
the beginning of the month, he was quite astonished in his
meeting with President Ahmadinejad when President
Ahmadinejad explained that while Britain and the United States
won the last world war, Iran was going to win the next one. Now,
Kofi Annan didn’t even realize there was going to be a next world
war. Much less, than Iran intended to emerge victorious from it.
Do not underestimate the ambitions of a group which feels that
they represent a quarter of the world, namely the world’s
Muslims. They feel, that they’ve brought down one superpower,
the Soviet Union, thanks to the, the Mujahadeen in Afghanistan,
and that indeed, they can bring down another. They have very
extensive ambitions. So this issue of whether to allow them to
have nuclear weapons, is of extraordinary import to us. That is
why we should be prepared to make credible threats of the use of
force. Only through making credible threats of the use of force, is
the kind of diplomacy that I described is going to be successful. If
we begin that diplomatic process by saying at the end of the day,
we are prepared to live with you, to tolerate this nuclear Iran, we
will get nowhere with that diplomacy. We will get nowhere with
forging an international consensus for strong actions of the kind
that we have been able to use successfully to slow down Iran’s
program for the last 18 years. Paradoxically only the credible
threat of force is likely to prevent us from facing the danger of
force. We have talked a lot about whether or not the United
States will bomb Iran. Let us recognize, if Iran gets the bomb, it
may bomb us.

Robert Siegel:

Thank you Patrick Clawson. George Perkovich.

George Perkovich:

Again I’m confused by the terms. Because we agree with almost
everything especially that Patrick said. And with much that
Reuel and Bill said about its, the nature of the Iranian
government. What we want for the people of Iran. How bad it
would be if Iran got nuclear weapons. And I don’t understand
what it means not to tolerate. Because Patrick has used the verb
say. We should say we won’t tolerate. He said we should have
credible threat by using force but avoids the issue of would it be
our policy actually go to war. Which to me means not tolerate.
Bill’s clear at least, he’s saying yeah you know yeah we’ll go to
war. Um that’s what the resolution means on their side. Not
tolerate means physically stop. Physically try to act against. And
then the question is does that guarantee success? There is no
guarantee of success. We found the trouble in Iraq that was
totally unanticipated. Reasonable people would expect things to
go badly in Iran. So you can’t guarantee –

Robert Siegel:

One minute.

George Perkovich:

Success. We have an experience with China. When China was
getting nuclear weapons in 1964, the US Government was
prepared to launch nuclear war against it, to destroy China, to
keep it from getting nuclear weapons. Then we thought no,
instead of that we’ll give nuclear weapons to India in 1963. To
balance China. We were afraid that Mao was such a
revolutionary. He had killed more than twenty million of his own
people. Something the Iranian regime hasn’t dreamed of. We
thought it would be the end of civilization, that revolution would
happen everywhere under this nuclear umbrella. Well in fact we
decided that we couldn’t stop China. China got nuclear weapons.
Here we are today. China is a huge economic threat to us today
but it isn’t like you’re gonna go home tonight worrying that
China’s gonna wake up and nuke the United States. Which it
does have the capability to do. And which Iran for the foreseeable
future would have no capability to do. Do I think we should
publicly say we’ll tolerate it and welcome it? Absolutely not. But
the exercise here is to try and clarify in your own mind, in your
own plan –

Robert Siegel:

On that note George we will remain just that clarified and no
more. Next concluding statement from Reuel Marc Gerecht.

Reul Marc Gerecht:

Well I remember having a conversation with a good friend of
mine, Jeffrey Goldberg who now writes for the New Yorker and
used to write for the New York Times Magazine and Jeffrey had
just gone over to madrassas in Pakistan and he was interviewing
young students. And he kept asking them what do you believe
in? And they kept saying to him, I believe in jihad, I believe in
killing Americans. And he’d go to the next one – I believe in jihad,
I believe in killing Americans. And he kept doing that you know
day after day. And so he got some idea what they believed in.

Now the Iranians don’t ask that way all right. They’re vastly more
refined. That’s what makes them in many ways the most, and
also contradictory, that’s what makes them I would argue the
most interesting people in the Middle East. But do not make a
mistake, this question, this debate is about what is at the center
of their spirit. And they are dedicated, they are dedicated to the
jihad against the United States. They are the mothership of
much of the Islamic radicalism that we have seen and what is
striking about the regime in Tehran is that it hasn’t become more
moderate. It hasn’t in fact gone into a period of thermidor.

Robert Siegel:

One minute.

Reul Marc Gerecht:

That the moderates that everybody has hope in and I have hope
in them too, have been stuffed. And that you do not see them
coming forward. You do not see them gaining power where it
matters. It is great and wonderful that the average Iranian on the
street is in fact becoming much, much more moderate. It doesn’t
matter. What matters is the people at the top and they have not
and I sincerely suggest that you do not want people like that who
believe they represent God on earth and that they represent the
vanguard for all Muslims to have nuclear weapons.

Robert Siegel:

Thank you Reuel Marc Gerecht. Now to one of the most
interesting people in the Middle East, now to Sanam Vakil.

Sanam Vakil:

I appreciate Reuel’s comments that the government of Iran is the
vanguard of leading this one fourth of, and Patrick’s, one fourth
of the world into jihad. But that’s not the government that I’m
aware of and that I have been studying. Perhaps two different
countries that we’ve been working on. And my interviews that I
recently conducted in Tehran, many people in the variety of
camps of the regime, Ahmadinejad’s ministry as well, told me
repeatedly that it’s the constant threat from abroad, regime
change threats from the US administration that have been
coming from the past four years. Threats of sanctions,
containment, isolation of this regime that are perpetuating these
fears within the Iranian regime. So consider that when thinking
the Iranian mentality. There are two ways of going forward. We
have the military option. But we have an option that has never
been actually pursued. Twenty seven years of isolation, there’s a
wide gulf. Why not actually try direct engagement with these
crazy folks? And let’s see actually what they might do. If we’re
actually dealing with them one on one bring them close. Make
your enemies our friends. We can monitor their nuclear program
and often times there’s a lot of talk on the Iranian street that the
hope of having America back in Iran will actually stimulate the
Iranian people and recharge them and that might be the way to
perhaps lead to a prosperous and maybe even hopeful Iran in the
future.

Robert Siegel:

Thank you Sanam Vakil. And now I will hear from Bill Kristol.

Bill Kristol:

Really just three points. Proliferation, terror and jihad. The
proliferation threat is unlike that of when the Soviet Union or
China acquired nuclear weapons. It’s not just a generic
Venezuela, Brazil, South Africa, etc threat. Nigeria – that is a real
issue too. But it is an absolute I mean it is very likely that
Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Algeria would decide they would
want nuclear weapons if Iran had them. I don’t know if we could
stop them, we could offer them security guarantees, if people feel
comfortable living in a world where we’re providing security
guarantees against a nuclear Iran for a Wahabi Saudi Arabia. I
suppose we can try to manage that world. It would be safer I
think to prevent Iran from becoming nuclear in the first place.
We are talking about an extremely dangerous arms race in the
most volatile region in the world. That was not the case when
previous nations went nuclear. India, Pakistan a little bit more
like that. And Pakistan was the worst one to have allowed to
have gone nuclear but now this is Pakistan squared. So to speak.
Cubed or something. Second, terror, providing a nuclear
umbrella for terror is not something that’s been done. The Soviet
Union played with terror and did some pretty bad, funded some
pretty bad things but nothing like the intimate relation to terror
that the Islamic Republic of Iran has had. And people need to
think seriously about what a nuclear umbrella over terror acts
with the possibility of giving nuclear weapons to terror groups but
also protecting terror groups by a threat of nuclear retaliation.
What that does in the Middle East, here Israel I think becomes a
central question and how does that, how does Israel then react to
terror groups, protected so to say by Iranian nuclear threat of
retaliation. Finally, jihad, Patrick and Reuel have made this point
right. This regime, getting nuclear weapons would be the biggest
booster shot for jihad and I think both on the Shia and Sunni
side is possible. That is the threat. The jihadists need to, those
on the wavering need to be convinced that jihadists are losing –
letting this regime get nuclear weapons would convince too many
people unfortunately that they’re winning.

Robert Siegel:

Thank you Bill Kristol. And lastly Karim Sadjadpour.

Karim Sadjadpour:

I think one thing that’s been missing tonight is Iran’s ambitions.
Iran’s impetus. We talked a lot about what the US is thinking,
what Israel is thinking but we can’t look at Iran’s ambitions in a
vacuum. And if I would make the argument that as a – it’s not
that they want to pursue nuclear weapons to wipe Israel off the
map. We tried to get inside the head of Iranian leaders they say
well this revolution of ours happened twenty seven years ago and
to this day the US has never recognized us. And look historically
at countries that have pursued nuclear weapons. Not been for
offensive purposes. Has been very much driven by senses of
insecurity and defensive purposes. I would just invoke the
paradigm which many in the right in the US have invoked when it
comes to Iran. And that is one of two ticking clocks. So there’s
the regime change clock and there’s the nuclear clock. And the
idea is that you have to make the regime change clock in Tehran
expire faster than the nuclear talk so when the day comes when
Iran actually weaponizes, it will be under more friendly,
democratic Iranian regime. Now the fundamental contradiction of
this policy is that when you try to expedite the regime change
clock in Tehran you send the message to Iranian leaders that in
fact the United States is after nuclear, is after regime change
approach. And therefore you need to pursue a nuclear deterrent.
So we have to get these clocks worked up. Is the option, is the
goal to prevent Iran from going nuclear or is it to change the
regime? If we continue to try to do both, that’s going to be Iran’s
greatest impetus for pursuing a nuclear weapon.

Robert Siegel:

Thank you Karim Sadjadpour. And thank you to all six panelists
for your very ardent contributions. It’s now time to announce the
results of the audience voting and after our debaters did their
best to sway you, you voted eighty two for the motion that we
must tolerate a nuclear Iran. One hundred sixteen against. And
twenty one remain undecided or don’t know how they would
answer that. So congratulations to the opponents of the motion
for their winning the debate here this evening. And to the
proposer, and to the proposer and his team for increasing his
tally so much after the debate. I’d just like to invite all of you to
return in three weeks for the next Intelligence Squared US
debate. Wednesday, October 18th, it’s here at Asia Society and
Museum and the motion to be debated on that day is freedom of
expression must include the license to offend. And the panelists
will include such folks as Philip Gourevitch and Christopher
Hitchens. I’ll let you try to figure out which side of the offending
question Hitchens is going to be on. An edited version of tonight’s
Intelligence Squared US debate can be heard locally on WNYC AM
820 on Friday, October 6th at 2 PM. Outside of New York City
you’ll have to check your local NPR member station listings for
the date and time of broadcast there. Please be sure to pick up a
copy of our media sponsor’s Thursday edition of the Times of
London. And also a copy of the Times Literary Supplement on your
way out and thanks to all of you for your support of Intelligence
Squared US.

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